

EXHIBIT NO. 9

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18 JANUARY 1940.

DEAR JOE: AS of possible interest to you I am enclosing the General Board's report on organization of the Navy Department. Will be glad to get your comments if and when you get time.

I will drop entirely the question of Captain Smith coming to the PENNSYLVANIA for the purpose of acquiring CincC background on war plans.

Before he starts East I will ask him to ask you for an appointment so that you may send back any general thoughts you may wish to of a confidential nature which would be useful to all of us. In this connection I have a letter from Tommy Hart, just received, in which he thinks the situation in the Far East is very serious and that this year may prove to be a crucial and critical one. As I have written Bloch, and as you undoubtedly know, I have continually asked him to bear in mind what is going on to the Westward which in this particular period in this old world's history may be far more important to us than the troubles in Europe, especially if something should break and break quickly and without warning. It is something, in my humble opinion, for which you should be mentally prepared. Anything in this wide world I can do to help, of course I will; that is my only reason for existing here. Incidentally by officer messenger or otherwise, I would be glad to know what your thoughts are in that connection so that I may be in harmony and may be able to transmit them to higher authority if they should be asked.

Hope the Army Maneuvers have been greatly beneficial. The President is intensely interested in our working closely with them in all ways, and the pull-together here in the Department is very close.

Best wishes to you all as ever

Sincerely,

/S/ BETTY.

Admiral J. O. RICHARDSON, U. S. Navy,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
UNITED STATES FLEET
J. S. PENNSYLVANIA
FLAGSHIP

26 Jan. 1940.

EWB
R

Dear Betty:

The remarks in your letter of 18 Jan about the situation in the Far East, the possibility of something breaking without warning and my need to be mentally prepared are some what disquieting.

When the China incident started and on every opportunity until after I left the job as head P.H.O I used to say to Bill Leahy "Be sure to impress on the boss that we do not want to draw in the unless we have allies so bound to us that they can not leave us in the lurch."

There is a possibility that this constant repetition had something to do with the trip of Ingersoll.

When this understanding was reached it had some value but under present conditions it has little value as it affords us the use of a base in exchange for an obligation to protect about 2 1/2 continents.

I strongly feel that you should repeatedly impress on the boss that an Orange war would probably last some years and cost much money, my guess is 5 to 10 years 35 to 70 Billion dollars.

I have always thought that our Orange plan was chiefly useless on exercise in War Planning, to train officers in War Planning and to serve as a basis for asking for 16

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
UNITED STATES FLEET
U S PENNSYLVANIA
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appropriations and as a guide for developing our Navy and its shore facilities as to actually executing the O-1 plan I hope we will never be called on to do that unless the Administration fully realizes the probable cost and duration of such a war and unless our people are prepared to support an expensive war of long duration.

Even if we could take Truk what would we have a secure anchorage, nothing else, several thousand miles from our nearest drydock and adequate repair facilities and still hundred of miles from the enemy country. Of course it could not be taken without some underwater damage. In actually put on real pressure we would have to have a real base that would take many years and much money. We ought not to go into a thing like this unless we expected to see it through.

I hesitate to write you because the written word is so easily mis understood, also I do not know what your ideas are, what you are telling the boys, what is the meaning of our diplomatic moves, or our Senator's talks, or our neutrality patrol. But you are the principal and only Naval advisor to the race and he should know that our Fleet can not just sail away like George and be back at home in a year or so. Also the probable cost of any war should be compared the probable value of winning the war.

When we commissioned the San Diego DD's we used the facilities of San Diego, Base, active DD Tenders, etc

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working farther from active DDs and their tenders and
Marine Island yard. I think that an excellent job
was done but if it had been a real mobilization,
all of these activities would have been fully occupied.
How long would it have taken our legs to see to
have done this and its other mobilization work without
any outside assistance? A war plan if it is to be
executed should be based on realities.

All of this letter may be needless but I know that
if you do not tell the force what you really know
and feel about the probable cost and duration of
an Orange War Nobody will

I would hate to see our leaders make a move from which
they could not gracefully withdraw, and which would eventually force us
into a war, half heartily supported by our country. In other words
before the Nation takes a step I hope we will carefully examine
the direction we are heading, where we will eventually go and be
prepared to resolutely pursue the course whatever the cost.

I will forward this letter after I see ideas about and
send it to you by Tom

17 Oct.

I have seen Sharp and he has told me about
his work on this trip.

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The Minor Joint Exercise and Evolutions have
been completed. There was no evidence of any
fluctuation or discord. The exercise certainly led the
Army to believe that the Navy is highly efficient.

There is danger that many erroneous conclusions
will be drawn from this exercise. Of course in actual
war we could not have done any thing like using
all boats from 13Bs, Cts & Ds, for landing. The
boats would not have been on board and ships
could not have come on shore and supplied for
25 men while towing boats. There was no sea, no
surf and nothing but ideal weather.

If we ever do anything like this again I hope
we have adequate warning, plenty of time, and
super supervision.

!! we sending this by Land Cents.

Honestly

-- Richardson

23 Feb

OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

C.N.O.

I have not answered
this -

Mundy - had a letter
from Andrews and wrote
him the substance of my
letter to Faffinder -

Then later sent him a
copy of my letter to
Faffinder -

In my opinion further
reply is not necessary
unless to say that
Mundy has written to
Andrews -

R. L. G.

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

AIRMAIL
PERSONAL
CONFIDENTIAL

San Pedro, California
16 February 1940

OPNAV
for

Admiral H. R. Stark, U.S.Navy
Chief of Naval Operations
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Betty:

Today I received a despatch from Andrews, a copy of which is enclosed, urging that the information in regard to the change of home ports of vessels of the Hawaiian Detachment be released for publication. This is requested in order that the maximum number of unoccupied houses and apartments at Honolulu may be overhauled and made available for occupancy. I felt constrained to reply negative.

The delicacy with which you must handle this matter is fully appreciated; and the reasons for your negative reply to my previous despatch requesting that the security classification of the despatch changing the home ports of these ships (Opnav 031811 of February 1940) be lowered are fully understood.


It seems to me, however, that the provision of acceptable living accommodations will be highly conducive to contentment and morale. Therefore, I request that the restriction on publicity be eliminated as early as you deem it advisable, and that Andrews and I be informed by despatch.

It may be of interest to you to know that the fact that the home ports of these vessels have been changed appeared in the Los Angeles Times of 4 February under a Honolulu date line, and was subsequently copied in Long Beach and San Diego papers as shown by the enclosure.

It appears that this matter is widely known now, but in view of the restrictions on publicity Andrews probably feels that he can not officially urge private interests in Honolulu to prepare houses for the occupancy of Naval personnel.

With kindest regards and best wishes.

Sincerely,


J. O. RICHARDSON

[1]

UNITED STATES FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

SAN PEDRO, CALIFORNIA, 8 March 1940.

*Personal**Confidential*

Admiral H. R. STARK, U. S. Navy,

*Chief of Naval Operations,**Navy Department, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR BETTY: I am forwarding today, by air mail, my recommendation regarding a relief for the U. S. S. AUGUSTA. I find, in making this recommendation, that I am in a position in which I frequently find myself, in that I do not know all the points that should be considered in reaching a decision. For example:

(a) I do not know what considerations led to the assignment of Commander Scouting Force to command the Hawaiian Detachment, but if there were reasons controlling at that time there probably has been no change.

(b) I do not know why we have a Hawaiian Detachment, but if it has any relation to existing plans as stated in my official letter I think it should be commanded by Commander Cruisers.

(c) I do not know how much weight is attached to the necessity of having a cruiser available for the President, and I do not know whether he insists on having the HOUSTON so available, or whether another ship would be equally acceptable.

Andrews recommended that Commander Cruisers, Scouting Force, shift to the HOUSTON and remain in command of Cruiser Division FOUR with the Hawaiian Detachment, and that the present Commander Cruiser Division FOUR shift to the LOUISVILLE or CHESTER in command of Cruiser Division FIVE, and return to the West Coast with that division, and that the AUGUSTA be assigned to Crudiv FIVE.

It does not seem logical to me to have both Commander Cruisers, Scouting Force, and Commander Scouting Force, in the Hawaiian Detachment. As things now exist, Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force, frequently sends recommendations to me in order [2] to save time, with copies to Commander Scouting Force, and Commander Scouting Force frequently makes recommendations affecting the cruisers without having the recommendations of Commander Cruisers, Scouting Force.

Any number of solutions could be suggested and any one that you select will be acceptable to me because I have made what appeared to me to be a logical recommendation, but I have no personal pride in it, and any solution will work. However, the easiest one that would not disturb existing conditions would be to send the HOUSTON out as temporary relief of the AUGUSTA, and have the AUGUSTA return to China after her overhaul.

In any event, there will be no heavy cruiser with the Fleet for several months this summer while Cruiser Division FIVE is undergoing overhaul, and I know that both Bloch and I feel that there should be two divisions of heavy cruisers with the Fleet.

I do not know why Cruiser Division SEVEN is retained with the Atlantic Squadron. Consequently, I have made no recommendations or requests that that division rejoin the Fleet. Neither have I recommended that one of the divisions now in the Hawaiian Detachment return with the Fleet.

With kindest regards and best wishes.

Very sincerely yours,

/S/ J. O. RICHARDSON.

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

San Pedro, California
11 March 1940

PERSONAL
CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Betty:

In going over the memorandum you enclosed with your letter of 12 February (Subject: Defense of the Fleet against attack by aircraft), my first reaction was somewhat similar to Admiral Bloch's, that is, no harm can come from letting the General Board consider the comprehensive agenda contemplated - although at the same time there arose in my mind a question as to how much good might result from such an undertaking. In justice to the serious thought that has gone into the preparation of the memorandum and its enclosure, I have given the matter detailed study and my general conclusions are as follows:

(a) The General Board is well within its intended scope in studying all matters relating to improvements in armament. I believe that it has generally been understood that the General Board would deal principally with major characteristics, although it is understandable that full treatment of major characteristics may require varying degrees of consideration of details of batteries and fire control equipment.

(b) In my opinion the General Board would be stepping outside its intended scope if it were to consider matters immediately connected with details of training and operation of existing personnel, ships, and equipment. I say this with the realization that article 402 of the Navy Regulations uses the very words "organization, maintenance, training, and operation", which might be invoked to refute my opinion. However, I choose to believe that the terms "system of principles" and "general terms" used in the same article do not contemplate treatment of all of the phases and details included in the proposed agenda.

Applying these general conclusions to the several sub-heads of the proposed agenda, I consider items to be matters appropriate or otherwise for the General Board's specific consideration and recommendation, as follows:

The Fleet.

Treatment of none of these items by the General Board is either necessary or desirable. All are actively under consideration within the Fleet. As you will know, the re-✓

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¹ Subsequent pages of this letter, upon investigation, appear not to be in existence.

Confidential

15 MARCH 1940.

DEAR J. O.: I am somewhat at a loss as to just how to answer your questions (a), (b) and (c) in your letter of 8 March.

I do not know whether Bloch left his personal file of correspondence between him and me, for you to read over or whether he talked it over with you. The background for sending the Hawaiian Detachment was for the most part contained in this personal correspondence.

One of the first questions which was brought to me after I took over this job was the possible reinforcement of the Asiatic Fleet which had been requested by Admiral Hart. This reinforcement was to be preferably, according to Hart's request, a division of heavy cruisers. His second choice was a division of light cruisers. The situation in the Shanghai Settlement in regard to control of that area was tense. The situation in Tientsin, especially in regard to British Japanese relations, was critical. The war in Europe was breaking. We wanted to do what we could for Hart, strengthen the State Department's hands, and at the same time not weaken our own position.

I looked into the question of our War Plans, especially as to the Commander-in-Chief's Operating Plan for an Orange campaign. This seemed to meet a strategic situation in the Pacific in a manner by which Hart would be supported by naval deployment, and the Commander-in-Chief would still have close control over all units of the Fleet.

The result was that on 8 September I wrote to Bloch and made the suggestion of sending a detachment to Hawaii, but only after I had talked it over with the President and the okayed it one hundred percent; as did the State Department.

There were several despatches back and forth (Opnav 0022-1815, 0024-1225, CinCUS 0023-1255, all of September), and also one or two telephone calls. Bloch recommended that Andrews be in command; he also recommended that my first suggestion of moving the submarines to Hawaii be held up; I concurred in both recommendations. Admiral Bloch was opposed to sending any more cruisers to the Asiatic. They were not sent.

We did reinforce the Asiatic by one tender, one squadron of patrol planes and six new submarines. The Hawaiian Detachment fits in with the Commander-in-Chief's Operating Plan Orange.

When the time came for the Hawaiian Detachment to go, a proposed press release as drawn up showing the reason to be "For the purpose of facilitating training operations." The President finally said: "Do not release it to the press."

Hardly had the Detachment arrived in Hawaii when the question of rotation came up. After a good deal of correspondence back and forth we took the bull by the horns and sent out our directive in regard to this question (CNO Serial 938 or 4 January 1940). Of course the question of home ports and transportation of dependents was a big item in arriving at the final decision.

My original ideas in regard to the Hawaiian Detachment were that possibly, in fact probably, the Commander of this Detachment would be able to carry out the regular schedule of gunnery firings and for training would be able to visit the various island possessions in the Mid-Pacific area to familiarize himself with these possessions and their potential uses in time of war.

I still think that the decision to send the Detachment to Hawaii under present world conditions is sound. No one can measure how much effect its presence there may have on the Orange foreign policy. The State Department is strong for the present setup and considers it beneficial; they were in on all discussions, press releases, etc.

I find that in the above I have more or less covered your paragraphs (a) and (b). I cannot help but feel that a Vice Admiral should be in command of the Hawaiian Detachment. He would probably command the above force prescribed in War Plans. Administration may be difficult but it will be more difficult in war and means should be developed to offset this difficulty.

In regard to your question (c), of course I don't know whether the President will go to the Coast before his term of office expires or not, but I think the chances are that he very probably will; in fact he intended to go last October and couldn't. At that time he told the people in San Francisco that he would try and come at a later date. My guess is that if world conditions will permit his leaving Washington you will see him sometime before Winter on the West Coast with the desire for a fishing trip, or more possibly a desire to go to Alaska which he has so often expressed. A cruiser force flagship or its equal will be required, because the President will doubtless want to take someone with him. When he went to the

Canal Zone in the TUSCALOOSA he was comfortable but he had cut down his entourage to the minimum.

In regard to the relief of the AUGUSTA, I have received your official letter and we are now making a careful study of it from all angles and hope to find a solution which will be satisfactory in the main to both ends.

The decision to retain one division of CAs in the Atlantic was made after considerable discussion with the President. Some would have two divisions. I held one division is enough, supplemented as it is by a couple of CLs. With the general requirement of two cruisers in the Caribbean and two on the North Atlantic Coast, we cannot well do with less. For the time being at least we will have to retain one division of CAs on this side.

I will be glad to get your reply to my letter on the CL Force Flagship. Personally I do not see it—but I am prepared to do what you want.

Every good wish as always and best of luck.

Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral J. O. RICHARDSON, USN,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS "Pennsylvania,"
San Pedro, California.

P. S.—Mr. Edison expects to leave Washington on 26 March and join the Fleet 1 April; leave Hawaii in NASHVILLE 15 April, arrive San Francisco 20 April; inspect San Diego about 24 April and return to Washington about 28 April. I do hope you can acquaint him with the Navy on this trip. Deyo will take up the details on his arrival in the West, etc. and you will be acquainted with them later.

8 APRIL 1940.

DEAR JO: I have just been glancing over your letter of 8 February to Admiral Nimitz to check my memory on one of your questions as follows: I did it because of some information which came in this morning.

(a) Is "CinCus facing trouble in the Western Pacific" so surely as to warrant giving that consideration greater weight in the preparation of the flag slate than the usual peacetime considerations of training flag officers for higher command: If so, the best should be kept at, or ordered to sea.

I believe Nimitz answered your letter but was not able to answer the above question. I want now to answer that question with an emphatic affirmative. I believe the situation in the Far East is continually deteriorating so far as our relations with Japan are concerned. I may be unduly pessimistic but I do want to communicate my thoughts for what they are worth and I might add they are backed by some pretty concrete evidence. I think you should continually keep uppermost in your mind the possibility of trouble in the Orient, and the means to meet it.

The President has been troubled with a bad cold and we are about two weeks overdue in an appointment with him; however, we are hoping we will have it within the next few days and after he has agreed to the topside slate we will send you his desires for your further recommendations lower down.

I am also in hearty accord with the last paragraph of your letter and to save you the trouble of checking I am quoting it:

"If the eminence of trouble does not outweigh other considerations, I think that the most promising material for high command should be given adequate sea experience at the expense of the less promising, and that a long range plan should be prepared with a view to having the best possible available with recent Fleet experience and with adequate time to serve when those now in high position in the Fleet step out of the picture."

Here's hoping the Maneuvers are highly beneficial from every standpoint.

Every good wish as always,

/s/ BETTY.

[Copy of Mr. Edison's letter of 5/7 enclosed]

Confidential

Mailed 5/8/40 to catch clipper of 5/14
7 MAY 1940.

DEAR J. O.: Just hung up the telephone after talking with the President and by the time this reaches you you will have received word to remain in Hawaiian Waters for a couple of weeks.

When the Fleet returns to the Coast (and I trust the delay will not be over two weeks, but I cannot tell) the President has asked that the Fleet schedule be so arranged that on extremely short notice the Fleet be able to return concentrated to Hawaii Waters. This will present somewhat of a problem in lugging around more oil with you perhaps than usual and keeping more provisions on board because if action is wanted it will be wanted quickly. As far as I can see, your proposed schedule meets this requirement and unless you hear to the contrary you may assume it okay.

I am glad you want to run East to have a talk in the Department. Had you not suggested it, I would have myself. We have been making some close examinations into the War Plans recently and I remarked at the time I wished you could have been present. I trust your arrival here will not be delayed over about two weeks, beyond what it normally would have been.

Of course you know the thought behind the above and that is that the Italian situation is extremely delicate, the two weeks ahead regarded as critical; then - - - ???? nobody can answer the riddle just now.

I am still hopeful that our Expansion Bill will go through. The Appropriation Bill has also to be acted on. Other than these two items nothing of particular interest that I can think of for the moment from the Fleet standpoint.

I hope to get money for elevation of the NEW YORK, TEXAS and ARKANSAS guns. My feeling is that these ships are of little use as is, and that even if they have to be out of the Fleet under overhaul at a critical time, we should go ahead with them. Do you concur?

Am also looking into the question of one or two more flag officers in Atron which I believe you desire.

Am delighted you are able to give War Plans your personal attention. Personally I think it is one of our most important jobs.

I don't know how you feel about it, but I have always felt that CincUS was loaded up with too much in the way of material matters and administration; and that in general material matters should not go beyond type commanders, at least as far as routine items are concerned. For example if Combatfor wants to find out something about his destroyers, he can send for Comdesbatfor tell him, or better still, let Comdesbatfor write him or see him frequently enough to keep him in general touch. It seems to me force commanders should not have to sign or even think about the thousand and one material details which must detract from their more important duties; let the type commanders do this.*

I know you have a tough job in submitting the names of six rear admirals from among whom three may be ear marked for furlough. I have got to do the same myself. If you and Peck agree it will automatically make it easier. I just mentioned to the President the advisability of appointing the three of us to constitute a board to actually meet and make this recommendation. This would take away any political repercussions so far as the President is concerned. However, he didn't take to this idea and said all he wanted was to be told verbally the names.

With best wishes as always

Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral J. O. RICHARDSON, USN,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS "Pennsylvania," Pearl Harbor, T. H.

*This is just thinking out loud—but I would like to talk this over with you when you are here.

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

*Of course
to
be*

Pearl Harbor, T. H.
May 13, 1940

Dear Betty:

When Hill was detached last January he took with him to Washington some ideas, largely Bloch's, as to what might be acceptable to the Commander-in-Chief, (under the assumptions then made, to serve as a start from which Op-12 would develop basic assumptions to be officially transmitted, within a few weeks, to the Commander-in-Chief for use in making plans.

During a recent conference in the Twelfth Naval District it was brought out that we were woefully short of 5"-38 caliber ammunition at Mare Island.

I am unable to grasp the meaning of Opnav dispatch 112130 sent at 1630 last Saturday, but we are guessing that the Department has tentatively approved, with minor exceptions, the contents of the memorandum prepared for me by Hill, and that the Department will correct the ammunition situation at Mare Island.

*being
taken
care
of*

The assumptions under which the Hill memorandum was drawn up and under which all other operations in the Western Pacific have previously been considered, are today all different. Previous assumptions and estimates of the situation no longer hold.

It seems that, under present world conditions, the paramount thing for us is the security of the Western Hemisphere. This, in my opinion, transcends everything -- anything certainly in the Far East, our own or other interests.

South America is the greatest prize yet remaining to be grabbed. Until the outcome in Europe can be more clearly seen, security in the Western Hemisphere seems to be the most important consideration for us.

ChC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

I feel that any move west means hostilities. I feel that at this time it would be a grave mistake to become involved in the West where our interests, although important, are not vital, and thereby reduce our ability to maintain the security of the Western Hemisphere which is vital.


If the Fleet is to go west it can only start, properly prepared, from the West Coast where it can be docked, manned, stocked and stripped, and a suitable train assembled.

Rest assured that although I am entirely without information I realize your position, and I want you to know that if the situation becomes such that higher authority decides we should go West, all of us are ready to give all we have.

These are some of the things I wanted to talk to you about, and since I can not see you, I feel that I am duty bound to write you.

With kindest regards and best wishes,

Very sincerely yours,



Please acknowledge receipt by despatch.

Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. Navy
The Chief of Naval Operations
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship


P.S. On 9 April I sent Andrews with a detachment in to simulate a raiding force against Pearl Harbor, to serve as an object for attack by our patrol planes and Army bombers. Andrews reported sighting Navy patrol planes, but he did not see any Army bombers.

Today we were picked up by our patrol planes about 0630, but we did not see any Army bombers. However, our submarines made several successful attacks from fairly short ranges. We had a heavy swell with white caps so that it was difficult to see the submarines.

While the Secretary was on board, one of the SARA-TOGA'S fighting planes had a forced landing close aboard. The plane sank, but the Reserve Ensign was recovered without his even getting his feet wet.

Today one of the LEXINGTON bombing planes (SEU) had a forced landing. The plane sank, but the pilot and passenger were recovered with slight injuries.

The PENNSYLVANIA should anchor in Lahaina about 1700.



Serial 013212

22 MAY 1940.

Secret

DEAR JOE: When we sent our dispatch it looked as if Italy were coming in almost immediately and that a serious situation might develop in the East Indies, and that there was a possibility of our being involved. However, the recent "blitzkrieg" events in Europe have certainly altered the picture for the time being. Personally I think it has made more remote (for the moment at least) the question of a westward movement of the fleet. I agree with the tenor of your letter and you will be glad to know I had already so expressed myself. I also realize events may change this picture and possibly over night.

With regard to the specific questions raised in your letter of 13 May, the Joint Plan for Rainbow Two is about complete, and a copy of it, including the studies upon which it is based, will go to you shortly by officer messenger. This Joint Plan embraces in general all the basic assumptions listed in the memorandum Hill brought East. The joint tasks of this plan will require the operation of the Fleet in general with the fleet tasks set up in Hill's memorandum.

I think these assumptions are about the best upon which a basic plan of this nature can be promised, although in any preliminary operating plan which you may prepare at present, I think you should assume the present strength and disposition of the Fleet, in order to develop the problem from a practical basis.

As you get time in these strenuous days, I believe it would be advisable for you to go ahead with the preparation of a tentative Fleet Operating Plan for Rainbow Two, as we are most anxious to have the benefit of your detailed study of the difficulties involved, and the logistic and other requirements.

I wish you would keep constantly in mind the possibility of a complete collapse of the Allies, including the loss of their fleets. A very probable development of such a catastrophe is visualized in the Rainbow One Plan. Should the Allied fleets pass into the hands of the Germans, however, an entirely different, and far more serious situation would exist. I would appreciate your views regarding the best disposition of fleet forces in such an event.

Regarding the 5 inch 38 caliber ammunition we have realized the deficiency, and, as you probably know, Ordnance has now arranged for shipment of 20,000 rounds on the PYRO. We understand that this will complete the first increment of the mobilization supply on board and will give some room for target practice ammunition. It is my understanding that there will still be enough on shore on the West Coast and in Hawaii to meet mobilization requirements. I would be glad if you would confirm this.

I find that the 6 inch 47 caliber reserve supply on the West Coast is not what it should be. There are 6,000 shells out there and I have requested the Bureau of Ordnance to send a like quantity of powder by rail.

We are taking up the question of another Flag Officer in ATRON which you suggested. We hope to put this in effect in the near future; the idea being to assign this officer as Commander Destroyers Atlantic Squadron. Present plan is to rig up something on the DENEbola for him to use as an Administrative Flag Ship and then assign ad interim one of the new 1500 ton destroyers as a Tactical Flag Ship with the idea of recalling from the Fleet the SAMPSON (which seems most logical choice) or another 1850 destroyer to take the place of this new 1500 tonner tentatively assigned. On account of the anti-aircraft armament on the 1500 tonners I feel that the 1500 tonner would be more valuable to you than the SAMPSON, and at the same time the SAMPSON would give a little more room for Flag Quarters and Operating Staff accommodations. I do not want to tie up another cruiser as a separate Flag Ship. I sometimes feel there has been too much of this already. This seems to be the best solution for the problem, unless you can suggest a better one.

In regard to the disposition of cruisers I feel that the ST. LOUIS and HELENA should join the Fleet as soon as they are out of the Yard. They should get Fleet Training. They are valuable units to you. If we take them out of the Atlantic and send them to the Pacific I must replace them. Under the present situation the reduction in cruiser strength as it is, should, if anything, be augmented. There are two possible solutions: one, to assign Rowell and Cruiser Division FIVE to the Atlantic. This would give two heavy cruiser Divisions in the Hawaiian Detachment and two in the Atlantic. The other is to send Fletcher's Division, Cruiser Division THREE, to the Atlantic which would give one heavy Cruiser Division and one light Cruiser Division in the Atlantic, but would reduce

your Light Cruiser strength by one Division and would give you a total of three heavy cruiser divisions in the Pacific. Of course as soon as the TRENTON comes home from Europe we will have her overhauled and she will be available for duty where most needed in the Atlantic or Pacific in case either Cruiser Division THREE or FIVE is sent to the Atlantic. Please let me have your perfectly frank reaction to the above by dispatch (supplemented by air mail if you so desire).

You may draw back at the thought of reducing your cruiser strength at this time in the Pacific. This I can believe might well be your inclination,—as it would be mine. But, as I indicated above, the changing situation may push the decision one way or the other. In fact the picture may change by the time you get this letter to the extent that it may be necessary to send a real component of the Fleet to the Atlantic much as we would hate to do so and thus divide our forces.

The ST. LOUIS is due to be completed in Norfolk 15 July. The HELENA in New York, 9 July.

Th situation in some of the Southe American countries gives real cause for concern—and I say this advisedly. *If* Germany should win—then *what*????

Wish I could see you—and if the pressure here—day and night ever lets up—I hope to fly out.

Keep cheerful.

Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral J. O. RICHARDSON, *USN*,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS "Pennsylvania," Pearl Harbor, T. H.

P. S. Please acknowledge by dispatch.

Have literally lived on the Hill—State Dept.— & White House for last several days. Thank God yesterday I finally swung support for 170,000 men and 34,000 marines. Lots still in the mill—but I hope coming.

I hope to commision the remaining 35 DDs, 3 AOs & 36 SS—another personnel nightmare for the fleet—but I simply couldn't do it before.

Here's hopin.

BETTY.

| *Call on us!* |
Shusew

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

CONFIDENTIAL

Lahaina Roads, T. H.
 22 May 1940

OB

Dear Betty:

(?) As you no doubt well appreciate, I now must plan the Fleet schedule and employment for the next few months. To do this intelligently, however, it is necessary to know more than I know not about why we are here and how long we will probably stay. I realize that the answer to the second question is largely dependent upon the first, and probably also upon further developments, but nonetheless I should have something to go on. For instance, carrying out even a curtailed gunnery schedule will require wholesale movements of targets, tugs, utility planes, etc., from the Coast. The following are pertinent questions:

- (a) Are we here primarily to influence the actions of other nations by our presence, and if so, what effect would the carrying out of normal training (insofar as we can under the limitations on anchorages, air fields, facilities and services) have on this purpose? The effect of the emergency docking program and the consequent absence of task forces during the training period must also be considered. *here*
- (b) Are we here as a stepping off place for belligerent activity? If so, we should devote all of our time and energies to preparing for war. This could more effectively and expeditiously be accomplished by an immediate return to the West Coast, with "freezing" of personnel, filling up complements, docking and all the rest of it. We could return here upon completion. *how?*

As it is now, to try and do both (a) and (b) from here and at the same time is a diversification of effort and purpose that can only result in the accomplishment of neither.

If we are here to develop this area as a peacetime operating base, consideration should be given to the certain decrease in the efficiency of the Fleet and the lowering of morale that may ensue, due to inadequate anchorages, air fields, facilities, services, recreation conditions, for so large a Fleet. If only peacetime training is involved should the Bureau of Navigation and I not be advised so we may remove restrictions on officer details?

CinC File No.

**UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship**

CONFIDENTIAL

✓ The answer to your proposal to retain the ENTERPRISE at San Diego is dependent upon the answer to the above questions.

I am returning to Pearl Harbor with the Fleet on 24 May to remain until 10 June for upkeep. During the first week of this period, on the assumption that we are here for normal peacetime training, I will complete a survey of what is available and what are the minimum additional requirements in the way of:

| | |
|----------------------|--------------------------------|
| Auxiliary air fields | Airplane services |
| Targets | Athletic fields and facilities |
| Tugs | Provisions |
| Utility planes | Fuel |

Upon completion of this survey I may recommend a reduction in the number of carriers to be maintained in this area and I will probably request the allocation of funds for immediate work on auxiliary air fields and athletic fields and facilities.

Based on this survey and additional information from you, I may modify my orders regarding the shifting of tugs, tenders, targets, and utility planes from San Diego to Pearl Harbor.

At present the following are under orders to proceed to Pearl Harbor leaving the West Coast in June (except UTAH, BOGGS, and LAMBERTON, which are to come upon completion of overhaul in July or August):

- (a) Entire utility wing, including drone squadron, less Atron units and less minimum base units for continued overhaul, and for acceptance of new units (chiefly new drones). This amounts to approximately 40 planes and 300 personnel. The sufficiency of present facilities for repair and operation of these is questionable. However, without practically all the utility wing present in this area it is certain that the gunnery schedule of the Fleet will be seriously curtailed.
- (b) Three battle towing targets and four series 60 high speed sleds, and a number of series 40 high speed sleds, are to be towed or carried to the Hawaiian area by Base Force tugs and other Base Force vessels noted in (c) and (d).
- (c) MEDUSA, MELVILLE, WHITNEY, DORSEY, ELLIOT, and UTAH, BOGGS, and LAMBERTON, on completion of overhaul.

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

CONFIDENTIAL

(d) One oil barge and one garbage lighter, and five tugs.

If the Fleet is to remain here and carry out normal peacetime training it will be conducive to efficiency of administration, to the carrying out of employment schedules and to the most effective use of services and operating areas if the ships and services of the Hawaiian Detachment are incorporated under their normal type commanders. Unless advised to the contrary by you before 30 May, this will be done.

In any event and whatever the future holds, we seriously need additional enlisted personnel. We should no longer be content to operate with any vacancies in peacetime allowance materially below our needs and our complement. With so many ships building and other ships to be recommissioned, we must have many additional trained men. It will take a long time to train them. I urge that all training stations be operated to full capacity. Trained men are fully as important as additional material and equipment.

If we are in the preliminary stage of preparation for belligerent action our ships should be fully manned by the most competent available officer personnel. Peacetime shifting of officer personnel should cease. With my lack of knowledge of the Department's purposes and intentions, I feel that we may work at cross purposes, and the whole matter of officer personnel changes may become most confused.

With kindest regards.

Sincerely yours,

J. O. Richardson
J. O. RICHARDSON

Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. Navy
Chief of Naval Operations
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

*Admiral Stark
4 May 1942
Secretary Dept
Navy*

BC

Secret

27 MAY 1940.

DEAR JO: Yours of the 22nd just received. I shall endeavor to answer it paragraph by paragraph. First, however, I would like to say that I know exactly what you are up against, and to tell you, that here in the Department we are up against the same thing.

Why are you in the Hawaiian Area?

Answer: You are there because of the deterrent effect which it is thought your presence may have on the Japs going into the East Indies. In previous letters I have hooked this up with the Italians going into the war. The connection is that with Italy in, it is thought the Japs might feel just that much freer to take independent action. We believe both the Germans and the Italians have told the Japs that so far as they are concerned she, Japan, has a free hand in the Dutch East Indies.

Your natural question may follow—well, how about Italy and the war? I can state that we have had Italy going into the war on 24 hours notice on several different occasions during the last two weeks from sources of information which looked authentic. Others have stated that it would occur within the next ten days. I have stated personally that cold logic would dictate her not going in for some time. It is anybody's guess. It may be decided by the time this reaches you. Events are moving fast in Northern France.

The above in itself shows you how indefinite the situation is.

Along the same line as the first question presented you would naturally ask—suppose the Japs do go into the East Indies? What are we going to do about it? My answer is that is, I don't know and I think there is nobody on God's green earth who can tell you. I do know my own arguments with regard to this, both in the White House and in the State Department, are in line with the thoughts contained in your recent letter.

I would point out one thing and that is that even if the decision here were for the U. S. to take no decisive action if the Japs should decide to go into the Dutch East Indies, we must not breathe it to a soul, as by so doing we would completely nullify the reason for your presence in the Hawaiian area. Just remember that the Japs don't know what we are going to do and so long as they don't know they may hesitate, or be deterred. These thoughts I have kept very secret here.

[2] The above I think will answer the question "why you are there". It does not answer the question as to how long you will probably stay. Rest assured that the minute I get this information I will communicate it to you. Nobody can answer it just now. Like you, I have asked the question, and also—like you—I have been unable to get the answer.

I realize what you are up against in even a curtailed gunnery schedule. I may say that so far as the Department is concerned you are at liberty to play with the gunnery schedule in any way you see fit, eliminating some practices for the time being and substituting others which you may consider important and which you have the means at hand to accomplish. Specifically if you want to cut short range battle practice and proceed with long range practices or division practices or experimental or anything else, including anti-air, etc., etc., which you think will be to the advantage of the Fleet in its present uncertain status—go ahead. Just keep us informed.

We have told you what we are doing about ammunition; we will attempt to meet any changes you may desire.

We have given you a free hand in recommending ships to come back to the Coast for docking, etc.

You ask whether you are there as a stepping off place for belligerent activity? Answer: obviously it might become so under certain conditions but a definite answer cannot be given as you have already gathered from the foregoing.

I realize what you say about the advantages of returning to the West Coast for the purpose of preparation at this time is out of the question. If you did return it might nullify the principle reasons for your being in Hawaii. This very question has been brought up here. As a compromise, however, you have authority for returning ships to the Coast for docking, taking ammunition, stores, etc., and this should help in any case.

As to the freezing of personnel:—Nimitz has put the personnel problem before you. I will touch on it only to the extent that I have been moving Heaven and Earth to get our figure boosted to 170,000 enlisted men (or even possibly 172,300) and 34,000 marines. If we get these authorized I believe you will be comfortable as regards numbers of men for this coming year. I know the convulsion the Fleet had to go through to commission the 64 destroyers and some other ships recently.

I am thankful that convulsion is over. I hope the succeeding one may be as light as possible and you may rest assured that Navigation will do everything it can to lessen this unavoidable burden on the Forces Afloat.

I had hoped your time in the Hawaiian area would have some indirect or incidental results regardless of anything else, such as—

(a) Solving the logistic problems involved, including not only supplies from the U. S. but their handling and storage at Pearl Harbor.

(b) Training, such as you might do under war conditions.

[3] (c) Familiarity of Task Forces with the Midway, Aleutian, Palmyra, Johnston, Samoa general area, in so far as may be practicable.

(d) Closer liaison with the Army and the common defense of the Hawaiian area than has ever previously existed between Army and Navy.

(e) Solving of communication problems involved by joint action between Army and Navy and particularly stressing the air communications.

(f) Security of the Fleet at anchor.

(g) Accentuating the realization that the Hawaiian group consists of considerably more than just Oahu.

You were not detained in Hawaii to develop the area as a peacetime operating base but this will naturally flow to a considerable extent from what you are up against.

As to the decrease in the efficiency of the Fleet and the lowering of morale due to inadequate anchorages, air fields, facilities, service, recreation conditions, for so large a Fleet;*

I wish I could help you. I spent some of my first years out of the Naval Academy in the West Indies,—I remember the last port I was in after a 22 month stay and where we didn't move for 6 months; and there was not even one white person in the place. The great antidote I know is **WORK** and homemade recreation such as sailing, fishing, athletics, smokers, etc. You can also move Task Forces around a good deal for seagoing and diversion; just so you be ready for concentrations should such become necessary. We will solve the oil situation for you for all the cruising you feel necessary.

In my letter of May 22nd I mentioned the possibility of moving some units of the Fleet to the Atlantic. This might be a small movement, or it might grow to a modified Rainbow No. 1,—modified as to assumptions and as to the distribution of the forces. In other words, a situation that we might be confronted with would be one in which the Italian and German Fleets would not be free to act, but might be free to send a cruiser or so to the South Atlantic. In such a case there would be no need to send very extensive forces to the Atlantic, and the continuance of the Fleet in the Pacific would maintain its stabilizing influence.

Units that might be called to the Atlantic, under such a modified Rainbow situation, to provide for conditions that *now* appear possible, would be a division of cruisers, a carrier, a squadron of destroyers, possibly a light mine layer division possibly Patrol Wing One, and possibly, but more unlikely, a division of submarines with a tender.

If you desire to have task groups visit the Aleutians, and the islands in the mid-Pacific and south Pacific somewhat distant [4] from Hawaii, the possibility of such a call being made,—for the detachment of such a force to the Atlantic—should be borne in mind.

Also, it should be borne in mind, in connection with any movements of Navy units to the southward that a situation might arise which would call for visits to French or British possessions in these areas. We will strive to keep you informed on these points as the situation changes or develops.

I believe we have taken care of your auxiliary air fields by granting authority for leases and I may add that we are asking for authority to do something permanent in this connection in bills which we now have pending before the Congress and which should be acted upon within the next two weeks.

Fleet Training has recently sent you a letter with regard to targets and target practice facilities in general. We will do everything we can to assist you in this situation and I trust that something permanent will come out of it so that in future situations of this kind the 14th District will be much better off.

Regarding the carrier situation, we are prepared to go along with you on whatever you decide is best after you complete your survey.

Regarding splitting the Hawaiian Detachment back into its normal type commands:—We will naturally leave this matter entirely in your hands. If a part of the Fleet is brought to the Atlantic Coast, or if the main part of the Fleet is

recalled to the West Coast, it may well, in any case, be necessary to formulate a task force for retention in Hawaii different from the composition of the present Hawaiian Detachment.

This letter is rather rambling and practically thinking out loud as I have read yours. Incidentally it should be read in connection with my letter to you of 22 May wherein was outlined the possibilities of having to send some ships to the Atlantic; and which you had not received when you wrote.

I would be glad if you would show Admiral Bloch this and also my last letter—as I want to keep him informed.

Rest assured that just as soon as I can give you anything more specific I will. Meanwhile keep cheerful and with every good wish as ever

Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral J. O. RICHARDSON, USN,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS "PENNSYLVANIA," Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

P. S. The European situation is extremely critical. Italy may act by 5 June which seems to be another deadline drawn on information which once again looks authentic. However, it still is a guess.

Secret

JUNE 22, 1940.

DEAR JO: Your trip to Washington was held in abeyance because of uncertainty as to the movements of the fleet in the immediate future. Tentatively decision has been made for the fleet to remain for the present where it is. This decision may be changed at any time. It rests partly upon the question as to what happens to the French fleet. On this last there is no definite and final information as yet.

So all I can say is that the fleet must stay in a condition of complete readiness. By now you will have received my last letter, in which in reply to your question I stated I thought it would be best for you to concentrate your planning energies on a distribution of task forces to provide for the problems of Rainbow 1 modified by those set up in Rainbow 4. This picture is as yet unchanged.

The floating dry dock from New Orleans has recently completed the transit of the Panama Canal, and is being reassembled for towing on to Pearl Harbor as originally planned. A few days ago the question was brought up as to whether or not this plan would be carried out. After giving it some reconsideration, we decided to go ahead and take the dock on to Honolulu as it would be needed there to care for the forces that must be maintained in the Honolulu area in any case.

Guantanamo is receiving considerable development. In addition to air fields on both sides of the Bay, we are increasing the gun defenses by four 6" guns and four 3" antiaircraft guns. In the near future we will send about 105 additional Marines, and somewhat later, when its training has been completed, we will send down a Marine Defense Battalion of about 750 men.

I am also endeavoring to get two transports ready for the use of the Marines in the immediate future, one for the Atlantic (probably Caribbean) and one for the Pacific. We plan to load these transports with combat units of the Fleet Marine Force so that they will be strategically ready for immediate use,—such a transport full of Marines and equipment can be dispatched to a needed task in the same manner as we now dispatch a cruiser.

We recently, as you read in the papers, introduced a bill expanding the Navy sufficiently to provide for major tasks simultaneously in both oceans, and of a strength that will permit us at all times to have strong forces in each ocean. It is not our intention to have a permanent Atlantic fleet somewhat disassociated from the permanent Pacific fleet. However, there will necessarily be some decentralization in fleet command. We can talk this over when you come East.

Another subject to take up with you is the question of basing the fleet units that might be brought to the Atlantic—using Caribbean bases, primarily—Cristobal, Guantanamo and others.

This is the first of an attempt to write you a weekly letter. Hope they may prove to be of some use to you.

All good wishes,

Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral J. O. RICHARDSON. U. S. N.

Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,

U.S.S. "Pennsylvania," c/o Postmaster,
San Francisco, California.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
UNITED STATES FLEET
U S S PENNSYLVANIA
FLAGSHIP

Lahaina Roads, T.H.
22 June 1940

Dear Betty:

The enclosures are self-explanatory, and caused me to send confidential despatch 220603.

To clarify the situation, I flew to Pearl yesterday and held a conference with Andrews, Bloch, and General Herron, commanding the Hawaiian Department. Briefly, on 17 June, due to the "Alert" from the War Department, the Army issued live ammunition to all posts including A.A. batteries, etc., and established a patrol and guard over all critical areas, which are considered by them to be, all landing beaches, land areas (bridges, roads, etc.) and Pearl Harbor (Marines). Their directive included a proviso that all despatches were to be sent in code via cable to the Chief of Staff and that the public in Honolulu were not to be excited, hence no Army was stationed at waterworks, electric light plant, gas or telephone companies, but extra precautions were taken by these latter.

The navy increased their distant plane patrol from 180 miles to 300 miles and enlarged the sector being covered to include from 180° to 360°, as well as establishing a 30 mile inner patrol.

Two days later, the Army received word to "ease up on the Alert", but to maintain guard on all critical areas on a semi-permanent basis. We did not know about this, until General Herron mentioned it at the conference in reply to my query as to how long the Alert would continue. General Herron stated that he might, on the 24th, further modify his present interpretation of the "modified alert".

As a matter of interest, Herron said he had been asked if he could store crude rubber and tin to the extent of 600,000 cubic feet (his figures) and further that no such storage space was available.


COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
UNITED STATES FLEET
U S S PENNSYLVANIA
Flagship

Admiral Stark - 2

The Army "Alert" and action taken caused me some concern though I felt positive that any Army intelligence bearing on the above would be available to and evaluated by the Navy, with information to me. Of course, anything of this character tends to aggravate the tenseness of the situation and to interrupt training, as the Fleet is operating from Lahaina and Pearl by single ships and groups and without the full screening and scouting which a more serious situation would necessitate.

✓
As a similar situation may again arise, I believe a remedy would be to insure that where possible, when joint action is involved, even in drills, that the Commanders of the Army and Navy be jointly informed, with definite information to me as to whether the alarm is real or simulated for purposes of training.

With best regards,



J. O. RICHARDSON

Admiral H. R. Stark, U.S.N.
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

"COPY"

SECRET

U. S. S. INDIANAPOLIS,
 Pearl Harbor, T. H.
 Tuesday, 18 June 1940.

Memo. for Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.

Rear Admiral Bloch visited me yesterday stating that he had just been informed by General Herron, in secret, that he (Herron) had just received orders from the War Department placing Army in this area on the "Alert". This was done with special emphasis on possible carrier and plane attacks. He asked Bloch for a distant air patrol and inner air patrol.


I explained to Bloch your present patrol plan and informed him that I would establish immediately an inner patrol which I did at 1300 yesterday and am continuing same. General Herron desires that a VP patrol be established covering western semi-circle with Oahu as center instead of present VP patrol from Lahaina which as you know covers from 220 to 335 distance 180 miles.

I agree with Herron and I have VP to establish such a patrol which must begin at dawn each day.

I have discussed this matter with Fitch who is ready to start when you give the order.

I have also informed Rear Admiral Calhoun in secret.

If you desire this patrol established in lieu of present patrol I suggest that you send Combasefor a message "Affirm patrol" and this new patrol will be started tomorrow. Such a patrol is pictured as below:



Sector to be searched daily - Western semi-circle. The Army will cover night patrol, leaving us day patrol only.

Calhoun and I are awaiting instructions.

Respectfully,

I sent "Affirm patrol" to Andrews and receipt of this. *Adolphus Andrews*

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AT 2250 (LOCAL TIME) ON 18 JUNE, 1940, SENT THE FOLLOWING
TO COMMANDANT, 14TH NAVAL DISTRICT:

SECRET

"WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHETHER REQUEST OF COMMANDING GENERAL
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT FOR ADDITIONAL AIR PATROL IS A PART OF
ARMY EXERCISE OR IS IT BASED UPON INFORMATION FROM THE WAR
DEPARTMENT"

AT 0945 (LOCAL TIME) ON 19 JUNE, 1940, THE FOLLOWING
REPLY WAS RECEIVED:

CONFIDENTIAL

"REQUEST OF COMMANDING GENERAL WAS BASED UPON A DIRECTIVE
FROM THE WAR DEPARTMENT X HE HAS NO INFORMATION AS TO
WHETHER OR NOT IT IS AN EXERCISE"

"COPY"

SECRET and
PERSONALCOMMANDANT
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
PEARL HARBOR, T.H.*Obv*
A

20 June 1940

Dear Richardson:

This will acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 20 June, received by plane this morning; I note the contents thereof and will carry out your wishes expressed therein.

General Herron received a dispatch from the War Department the other day which stated in substance: "Alert your forces against hostile oversea raid. This must be done in such a way as to prevent newspaper publicity or notice of foreign intelligence agents. Department suggests that you do this on a maneuver basis in order to accomplish the above." General Herron brought this dispatch down to me and told me he was taking the necessary action and hoped that the Navy could see its way clear to have an off-shore patrol each day and do anything else in its power. I consulted Andrews and an off-shore and in-shore patrol around Pearl Harbor has been arranged concerning which you have been advised by Calhoun. I have no idea of how long this situation will exist, nor as to the gravity thereof; for two days I had out the Fleet Marine Force and their anti-aircraft guns with ammunition. I called them in yesterday inasmuch as it was necessary to keep their ammunition under tarpaulins in the vicinity of the guns and this did not look like a very safe practice inasmuch as they were deployed in the heart of the navy yard. My idea is, if something more definite is not heard by Monday, I will probably put them out again on Monday and on a distant station somewhere near the Army guns.

I have many things of relative importance and unimportance to discuss with you. Everything goes along smoothly and busily. I took the liberty of telling Eddy that I thought he should go back with Rucker in the plane today without giving him any reasons.

With my warmest regards,

Sincerely,

/s/ C. C. BLOCH.

Admiral J. O. Richardson, U.S.N.,
Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet,
U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship.

CCB;kt

MC

file 4

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. ENTERPRISE, FlagshipAIR MAIL
PERSONAL
CONFIDENTIALHonolulu, T. H.
18 September 1940.

Dear Betty:

While the Secretary was on board the ENTERPRISE he said to me, "Admiral, will you come to Washington in early October while you are on the Pacific Coast?". I replied, "I can not come to Washington except under orders, but if Stark wants to see me I suppose I will be ordered."

Just before leaving Pearl Harbor the Secretary said, "Admiral, I will talk to Stark and it is possible that we may want you to come to Washington for a conference." I replied, "I will be glad to come any time I am wanted."

I do not know of any benefit to the Navy that would accrue from my coming to Washington as I fully and frankly expressed my views to the Secretary on all points where I felt that such expression might help the Navy or the Nation. I also gave him a memorandum which covered the more important points discussed with him. Nevertheless, if you or the Secretary want me to come I will be pleased to do so.

During the past six months the Fleet has been visited by two Secretaries. During the last visit the Secretary made a most favorable impression upon the officers and men of the Fleet and I have frequently heard officers say, "I hope that Colonel Knox remains as Secretary regardless of the outcome of the election."

In the Fleet we did all we could to show both Secretaries what we are, what we are doing, and what we are thinking. Regardless of whether we made a good impression on the Secretary I believe that it would have boosted our spirits a bit if, upon his departure, he had sent a dispatch to the Fleet in these waters or to Cincin expressing some appreciation of our efforts to show our wares or approbation of our endeavors to maintain an efficient Fleet. Personally I feel that the Fleet made a good impression, and that a dispatch would have been sent had the Secretary been accompanied by a competent aide.

Please tell Himitz that his letter of 30 August regarding six-year enlistments was delivered to me by the Secretary's Aide on Monday afternoon a few minutes before the Secretary left

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
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UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. ENTERPRISE, FlagshipAIR MAIL
PERSONAL
CONFIDENTIAL

the ENTERPRISE and after I had completed my serious talks with the Secretary.

With kindest regards and best wishes.

Sincerely,



J. G. RICHARDSON

Admiral H. A. Stark, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.

P.S. As far as I know I have nothing to take up
with the Department that can not be handled
by correspondence but if I am wanted in
Washington I am ready to come on arrival
at San Pedro
JGR

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. ENTERPRISE, Flagship
At Sea,
12 September, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY:

1. The following notes are submitted on the points which we discussed in my effort to meet your wishes to know officers, learn about ships and find out how you could assist the Fleet's preparation for war.

2. PERSONNEL(A) Officers.

(a) Promotion by selection best method yet devised. ✓

(b) Members should be allowed to serve on two successive boards if circumstances render it advisable (requires change by Congress).

(c) Sea duty assignments should be based on ability; the most promising officers should be given preference. *Ministry*
This would tend to create a division of officers into two classes, the most promising and the least promising, or an A and B list. *S. J. ...*

(d) The abuses of retirement for physical disability and the retention on active duty and delayed retirement of the physically unfit should be corrected. ✓

(B) Enlisted Personnel.

(a) While the enlisted strength increased 11,349 between 25 May and 15 August, the Fleet in the Pacific made a net gain of only about 600. Our enormous expenditures for material may prove futile unless there is a prompt and commensurate personnel expansion. *Ministry*

(b) The bottleneck of the training stations, limiting the rate of acceptance of new men, should be eliminated at once and emergency expansion should begin now without awaiting deficiency appropriations. We have not waited for specific appropriations in providing material expansion, and it is difficult to understand or explain to the Fleet why we are unable or unwilling to meet even more vital problems of personnel (involving the imperative necessity of making ready what we already have as well as training men for new construction) with equally direct and effective action. I estimate

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the time necessary to make a modern man-of-war's-man at 4 years. You can see the necessity of getting started on this training right away.

(C) Separate Air Corps.

- (a) Unquestionably a higher degree of cooperation will exist between our Naval air arm and other Naval arms if all of them continue to be intimately bound together in one Navy.
- (b) With a separate air corps there is bound to develop a loyalty to the Corps rather than to the Navy, a jealousy between the Corps and the rest of the Navy, many perplexing problems of supply, personnel, administration, and above all a serious loss in effectiveness. ✓
- (c) I know of no advantage to the Navy or the Nation that would accrue from the creation of a Naval Air Corps.

3. MATERIAL(A) Surface ships.

- (a) I believe new construction is being expedited as much as possible. Minelayers are needed for Atlantic Coast. ✓ *(b. 7. 1)*

(B) Aircraft.

- (a) A tremendous expansion in this field complicated by foreign orders as well as by our demands. Airplanes, either for sale or for training, should not be obtained at the expense of the active Fleet. Fleet planes must be replaced as rapidly as possible, with new planes, but old planes cannot be taken off until new ones are on hand. ✓ *Yes*
No

(C) Ammunition.

- (a) Build up the maximum reserve possible of anti-aircraft ammunition. ✓

4. OPERATIONS(A) Retention of the fleet in the Hawaiian Area.

- (a) From a purely Naval point of view there are many disadvantages attached to basing the fleet in this area, some of which are: ✓ *Yes*
No

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- (1) Difficulty, delay and cost of transporting men, munitions, and supplies.
- (2) Inadequacy of Lahaina as operating anchorage due to lack of security. ✓
- (3) Inadequacy of Pearl Harbor as operating anchorage due to difficulties of entry, berthing and departure of large ships. ✓
- (4) Congested and restricted operating areas, in the air and on the surface. Yes No
- (5) Inadequate facilities for fleet services, training, recreation and housing. Yes No
- (6) Prolonged absences from mainland of officers and men in time of peace adversely affects morale. ✓
- (7) In case of war, necessary for Fleet to return to mobilization ports on West Coast or accept partial and unorganized mobilization measures resulting in confusion and a net loss of time.

Handwritten note: ... to ...

Handwritten note: Yes & No
check this

Handwritten note: Yes & No
... ..

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- (b) If the disposition of the Fleet were determined solely by Naval considerations the major portion of the Fleet should return to its normal Pacific Coast bases because such basing would facilitate its training and its preparation for war.
- (c) If factors other than purely Naval ones are to influence the decision as to where the Fleet should be based at this time, the Naval factors should be fully presented and carefully considered, as well as the probable effect of the decision on the readiness of the Fleet. In other words, is it more important to lend strength to diplomatic representations in the Pacific by basing the Fleet in the Hawaiian Area, than to facilitate its preparation for active service in any area by basing the major part of it on normal Pacific Coast bases?
- (d) In case our relations with another Pacific Nation deteriorate, what is the State Department's conception of our next move? Does it believe that the Fleet is now mobilised and that it could embark on a campaign directly from Hawaii or safely conduct necessary train-

Handwritten note: we should work toward that end -
check

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I S. S. ENTERPRISE, Flagship

ing from the insecure anchorage at Lahaina which is 2000 miles nearer enemy submarine bases than our normal Pacific Coast bases? —

5. SHORE ESTABLISHMENT

- (a) I hope you will be constantly on guard not to have the position and purpose of the Shore Establishment over-emphasized. It has only one purpose - the support, maintenance and augmentation of the fighting Fleet. It cannot, of itself, damage an enemy. It is only human that some of those in Washington and long removed from the active Fleet, (predominantly staff corps) frequently fail to visualize the correct priority of objectives. ✓

6. NAVY PUBLICITY *YCS & N - per data somewhat restricted - but*

Practically all Navy Publicity, hearings before committees, speeches in Congress and handouts from the Navy Department have stressed one or more of the following ideas: *still good hope and work being on ground*

- (a) The Navy is built for defense.
- (b) A so-called adequate Navy will keep us out of war.
- (c) With an adequate Navy we can impose our will upon the Nations of the earth with little danger of becoming involved in war.
- (d) In the unhappy event of war the Fleet is a kind of mobile Maginot Line behind which the people can reside in peace with no obligation to their Country except to promise that their descendants will some day pay for the Navy.
- (e) The Fleet is fully manned, fully trained and ready to fight at the drop of a hat.
- (f) The comparative strength of navies is measured solely by material things.
- (g) Aviation is a cheap means of defense and that large numbers of planes and pilots will render the nation secure.
- (h) Outlying Naval bases and air fields, in themselves are weapons of defense.

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The type of publicity mentioned above is wrong in that it tends to lull the public into a false sense of security. It tends to weaken their moral fibre and to create an unhealthy national morale in a country which may be drawn into war on very short notice. For a people, who may actually be involved in war in a comparatively short time, to be told that they can risk war without danger or wage war without risk, may be fatally detrimental to the determined prosecution of the very war towards which such conceptions inevitably lead. At the beginning of the present war, the French and British had just these ideas, with the present result.

7. COOPERATION BETWEEN EXECUTIVE, STATE, WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS.

(a) Whether justified or not, I can not escape the feeling that the coordination and mutual understanding between the above departments of the government is not as close as is necessary for effective action.

(b) Before reaching a decision as to the disposition and movements of the Fleet, or units thereof, is the Navy Department consulted, are its views frankly and forcibly presented, and are its representations thoroughly understood and considered?

(c) Present policy appears to be headed towards forcing our will upon another Pacific Nation by diplomatic representations supported by economic measures, a large material Navy in process of construction, and the disposition of an inadequately manned Fleet in being. Can this be done and are we prepared to face war or the inevitable loss of prestige if it cannot? Have the objectives of such a war been formulated, and its costs considered and compared with the value of victory? Can such a war be won by defensive measures or by a people trained to believe that the Navy is for defensive purposes only, and that their whole obligation to their country can be met by the payment of taxes?

(d) The Commander-in-Chief has no responsibility for the formulation of National policy, but he has a definite responsibility for the efficiency of one arm upon which the government relies to enforce National policy, when its aims can not be secured by diplomatic means. He must be concerned over the question as to whether the strength and efficiency of the Fleet are commensurate with the aggressive policy of the administration in the Pacific. Especially so if there is a possibility that this

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policy will require implementation.

(e) Are objectives being formulated and plans made for our active participation in the European war? We cannot long remain half in and half out of such a war. We should decide now on definite objectives and plans and should not assume that we will fight this one like we did the last, i.e., by sending aviation and light forces for active participation and utilizing our heavy ships, in secure home bases, largely as training ships. Such a course would immobilize our heavy ships, which are most certainly going to be needed either in the Atlantic or the Pacific, depending on the progress of the war.

✓ correct
and
better

J. Richardson

H. H. K.

O.S.A.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

Important items to be discussed in the Department.

1. Mediterranean Study. Joint Board, (Admiral Stark)
2. Defenses and developments for new bases. Atlantic. Underground storage, auxiliary landing fields, etc. Will defense be entire responsibility of Navy, or will Army be involved? (Admiral Stark.)
3. Personnel increase. (President, after discussion with Admiral Stark, Admiral Nimitz.)
4. Fleet Training. Present training too elementary and cautious. What steps to make more advanced? (Admiral Stark)
5. Greater target practice, ammunition allowance and more drone practice. Ships with war ammunition allowance cannot carry sufficient target practice ammunition. Additional ammunition ships urgently and constantly needed. (Admiral Stark)
6. Great weakness in fast auxiliaries. What steps for early procurement of fast and adequate numbers of auxiliaries to cover all probable Fleet employment? (Admiral Stark - Admiral Robinson)
7. Mine laying by airplanes. What is contemplated? (Admiral Towers - Admiral Stark)

24 SEPTEMBER 1940.

DEAR JO: I am working on a letter for you but will send you a copy of my letter to Peck; it is self-explanatory.

I meant simply to mention Faulkner but got into something a little more serious.

Frankly, I do not like the look of things any too well. Spent over three hours in the State Department yesterday—something over two in the morning with Mr. Hull, Welles and Hornbeck, and then again in the afternoon over an hour with Mr. Welles. I believe had you been present you would have been in agreement with what I did and I pushed my thoughts home just as hard as I could. I may say that the same general picture so far as our attitude is concerned still holds, although I would not be surprised, confidentially between you and me, to see an embargo on scrap but this too would be along the lines State has been working on.

I strongly opposed, and I believe carried my point, an embargo on fuel oil for reasons which are obvious to you and with which I may say I think the State Department is in concurrence. I believe Mr. Hull brought it up to get a thorough discussion of the subject and Mr. Welles said he was in complete agreement with me.

Hope to get a letter off in the next day or two with a coverage of some of the thoughts that I have been playing with and, as you know, my mind is completely open to you, almost to simply thinking out loud.

With every good wish as always

Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral J. O. RICHARDSON, USN,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS "New Mexico," Long Beach, California.

P. S. Just received yours with regard to your coming East and will take it up with the Secretary. Unless there is something you feel you want to talk about or that crops up after your arrival on the Coast, I will tell the Secretary I see no need of your coming East, at least for the moment.

I am sorry the message was not sent to the Fleet. I have felt that was an Aide's job. When with the Secretary I always sent them; in the last case when I visited Hawaii I sent them for the Secretary not only to the Navy and to the Army but to the Governor as well. I will tell Mort Deyo to be on guard against these slips hereafter.

Perhaps a letter from the Secretary now would be helpful. I will talk to him about it.

25 SEPTEMBER 1940.

P. S. to my letter of yesterday.

After my note to you of yesterday I spoke to Mort Deyo about telegrams back to the Fleet or other activities after the Secretary's visits.

Mort told me that the Secretary was preparing letters himself as a result of his visit out there so you may expect to hear from him.

My feeling is that a letter sometime after a visit can never take the place of an appreciative despatch and I have so told Mort. Of course in the last analysis the Secretary is the Boss but I have given Mort the thought—here's hopin'.

Until you wrote I had not seen the sheet which placed officer and enlisted personnel under the Assistant Secretary or at least that particular item escaped my attention. It was not in the original suggestions I made to the Secretary. I immediately took it up with the Secretary and it has been changed; personnel now coming directly under the Secretary which is the same as it has been. Of course you know that BuNav and OpNav usually settle these things pretty much themselves.

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral J. C. RICHARDSON, USN.

1 OCTOBER 1940.

DEAR J. O.: I hated to send you the despatch last night that the house would be full when you got here. Kit had not intended to return until two weeks from next Sunday when Harold Gillespie from Honolulu expected to be with us. However he has been again delayed; will not be here when planned, and as the only reason for Kit remaining at the Lake was for his coming, and his coming now being indefinite, they decided to come down this week. By they I mean Kit and Kewpie (our daughter) and her two children and nurse girl which will fill the house to about 100 percent complement.

The Secretary wants very much to see you. I told him of your letter. However, one of the things he wanted to talk to you about is the possibility of sending a detachment to the Far East; it is being urged here by some. I have opposed it and so has Ingersoll. Your thoughts are likely to be determinative.

The question of where to hold the Fleet Problem will also be on the agenda.

In addition the Secretary says he would just like to talk to you anyway; so there you are.

I more or less took the bull by the horns with regard to getting more men aboard ship quickly and while we had written you about it the Secretary took it up with the President before we had time to get your reply, that is, with regard to cutting the training period to three weeks. I felt I was on fairly sound ground in bringing this up as my feeling is that it is in accord with your wishes. I would prefer to get twice the number of men in a given period and get them quickly rather than have them spend an additional five weeks or so at the Training Station.

Frankly I do not like the trend of things and I would not be surprised at anything happening any day. Your statement that we can not stay half in this war and half out sizes up the thing pretty well and I have long felt that it is only a matter of time until we get in.

I am writing the District Commanders a letter pointing out the gravity of the situation as I see it and will send you a copy. In this letter I made no attempt to go into much detail—my objective being that they get the spirit of the situation as I see it which would leave no stone unturned towards our immediate readiness. God knows I hope I am wrong because I realize what a little additional time would mean to us but sometimes things get out of hand either from the other fellow's action or our own.

Personally, I am looking forward as always to seeing you. I will keep the decks clear and will arrange our evenings according to your desires. The feminine part of my family are good soldiers on retiring upstairs and turning over the downstairs to stag get-togethers which I find are so beneficial these days.

For next Tuesday, 8 October, I am tentatively slating the following for dinner: The Secretary, Comdr. Murphy, Admirals Sexton, Robinson, Nimitz, Ingersoll, Towers, Furlong, Moreell and General Holcomb.

I am sorry that you will not be putting up with us as our quiet, late evening talks helped me so much when you were last here.

With every good wish as always.

Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral J. O. RICHARDSON, USN,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS "New Mexico," San Pedro, California.

P. S. I see no reason in the world for any secrecy with regard to your coming to Washington.

JOR/clp

Confidential

9 OCTOBER 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Points covered in talk with the President

1. Go ahead with assembly of Train.
2. Have we fuel oil in Samoa adequate to fill four (4) old light cruisers?
3. Give me a chart showing British and French Bases or possible bases for surface ships, submarines or airplanes in Islands in the Pacific, east of the International Date Line.
4. The British Ambassador stated that Ghormley was busy transmitting to the Department information regarding technical materials, and the British Admiralty felt that they should have officers prepared for staff conferences.
5. The British believe the Germans will attempt to occupy Dakar from Spain over land through Africa.
6. I (F. D. R.) can be convinced of the desirability of retaining the battleships on the West Coast if I can be given a good statement which will convince the American people, and the Japanese Government, that in bringing the battleships to the West Coast we are not stepping backward.
7. The President indicated that he might approve sending a Division of old Light Cruisers to visit Mindinao as a gesture. He did not appear favorably disposed toward sending a stronger force.

/s/ J. O. RICHARDSON.

Ex 27

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

07/10

Alb/01708

U. S. Navy Yard, Bremerton, Wash.
October 22, 1940

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| From: | The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet. | 06 |
| To: | The Chief of Naval Operations. | |
| Subject: | War Plans - Status and readiness of in view of the current international situation. | 06 |

1. Since the return of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, from his recent conference in Washington, and in view of the conversations that took place there, additional thought and study have been given to the status and readiness of the U. S. Fleet for war operations. As a result of this study, the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, feels it to be his solemn duty to present, for the consideration of the Chief of Naval Operations, certain facts and conclusions in order that there may be no doubt in the minds of higher authority as to his convictions in regard to the present situation, especially in the Pacific.

2. In order to bring out more clearly all the aspects of this situation, it is necessary to review certain factors affecting it and to discuss them in the light of present events.

3. On the occasion of his first visit to Washington, in July, and in personal letters to the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander-in-Chief stressed his firm conviction that neither the Navy nor the country was prepared for war with Japan. He pointed out that such an eventuality could only result in a long drawn out, costly war, with doubtful prospects of ultimate success. He left Washington with three distinct impressions:

First. That the Fleet was retained in the Hawaiian area solely to support diplomatic representations and as a deterrent to Japanese aggressive action;

Second. That there was no intention of embarking on actual hostilities against Japan;

Copy put out since.
Ex-13
Commodore
Captain
Ensign

Ex 27 29C 18a

Cinc File No.

U. S. A. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

08/10

Al6/01705

U. S. Navy Yard, Bremerton, Wash.
October 22, 1940Subject: War Plans - Status and readiness in view
of the current international situation.

Third. That the immediate mission of the Fleet was accelerated training and absorption of new personnel and the attainment of a maximum condition of material and personnel readiness consistent with its retention in the Hawaiian area.

4. On the occasion of his second visit to Washington, in October, 1940, an entirely different impression was obtained. It is true that the international situation, between the two visits, had materially changed, principally in that the danger of invasion of the British Isles was considerably less imminent, with consequent reduced chances of the loss or compromise of the British Fleet; in that the United States had more closely identified itself with Great Britain; in that Japanese aggression had progressed to the domination of Indo-China and gave signs of further progress toward the Dutch East Indies; and, in the open alliance between Germany, Italy and Japan, reportedly aimed at the United States.

5. As a result of these changes, it now appears that more active, open steps aimed at Japan are in serious contemplation and that these steps, if taken now, may lead to active hostilities. It is in connection with this eventuality that the Commander-in-Chief is constrained to present his present views.

6. The present O-1 Plan (ORANGE), WUSF 44 and WUSF 45, in the light of the present international situation, is believed beyond the present strength of the U. S. Fleet and beyond the present resources of the U. S. Navy. This is believed true for the following reasons:

- (a) The present strength of the U. S. Fleet is not sufficient to establish, at the earliest practicable date, the United States Joint Asiatic Force in the Marshall-Caroline Islands area in strength superior

CmC File No.

ALG/01708

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

370/10

U. S. Navy Yard, Bremerton, Wash.
October 22, 1940

~~SECRET~~

Subject: War Plans - Status and readiness of in view of the current international situation.

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to that of ORANGE and ready for further advance to the Western Pacific in condition to operate offensively in that area."

While recognizing the qualifying phrase "at the earliest practicable date," it is firmly believed that we cannot, at this time, even with Great Britain assuming responsibility for our Atlantic interests, desude that ocean of sufficient forces to protect our coastal trade and to safeguard our more vital interests in South America. Nor can we neglect the protection of our own and the interdiction of Japanese trade in the Southeastern Pacific. With these commitments adequately cared for, our remaining force is barely superior to ORANGE at the beginning of our westward campaign. It will undoubtedly be subject to attrition losses en route.

- (b) The Army is not now prepared and will not, in the immediate future, be prepared to support our western advance. The Fleet Marine Force is not sufficient to support the necessary operations alone.
- (c) The capture of BASE ONE is a major military operation requiring detailed knowledge of the area, detailed planning based on such knowledge, and the taking over, conversion, manning, training and organization of a large number of merchant ships. The establishment of the BASE, after its occupation, requires: (a), the transport of large quantities of material; (b), the organization, transport and maintenance of construction units capable of accomplishing the

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CinC File No.

A14/01706

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

U. S. Navy Yard, Bremerton, Wash.
October 22, 1940

Subject: War Plans - Status and readiness of in view
of the current international situation.

necessary development; and (c), the defense and supply of the base during the construction period. The Plan requires the completion of this BASE forty-five days after the arrival of the first material at the site.

We do not, at present, have the detailed knowledge of the area requisite for proper planning of these manifold activities. It is true that some knowledge, possibly sufficient for initiation of operations and general planning for the attack, may be obtained by reconnaissance after hostilities have commenced, and the Plan provides for such operations. However, it is not now known, nor can it be determined, until after actual occupation, whether or not the hydrography of the area permits the establishment of a fleet anchorage, what construction is possible on the land area under consideration and whether or not adequate defensive installations, particularly air fields for land-based aircraft, can be established. Granting that the base seized offers possibilities for the establishment of these facilities, it appears certain that the assembly of material and the organization for construction must await the actual occupation. To the knowledge of the Commander-in-Chief, no material has as yet been assembled for this purpose, nor have any but the vaguest ideas for the ultimate accomplishment of this objective been advanced.

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CmC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

A18/01708

U. S. Navy Yard, Bremerton, Wash.
October 23, 1940

Subject: War Plans - Status and readiness of in view
of the current international situation.

Present Fleet plans, due chiefly to lack of sufficient knowledge as a basis, and partly to the preoccupation of staffs of forces afloat with routine matters of administration and training, have been most general in nature and have extended chiefly to the assignment of tasks and forces. Only tentative ideas, (based largely on unsupported assumptions) for the actual accomplishment of the objectives, have been advanced.

- (d) The time element, in the present Plan, is believed greatly out of proportion to the tasks to be accomplished. While a definite time limit does not actually appear (except for the forty-five day limit mentioned above), it is strongly implied in the tables in Appendix II of WPL 14 and throughout the G-1 Plan itself, that the operations visualized up to the establishment of BASE ONE can be accomplished in a period of some sixty to ninety days after mobilization.

It is the firm belief of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, that even if energetic, single-purpose steps toward the first objective (BASE ONE) of the Plan were initiated promptly, a period of some six months to one year would be required for its accomplishment. With the knowledge now available, the time required for subsequent operations can not even be guessed at. It is believed to be of the order of years rather than months.

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

A16/01705

U. S. Navy Yard, Bremerton, Wash.
October 22, 1940

01-101257

Subject: War Plans - Status and readiness of in view of the current international situation.

(e) I know of no flag officer who wholeheartedly endorses the present ORANGE Plan. It is the general conception that the Plan had its inception primarily in the desirability of having a guiding directive for the development of the Naval Establishment to meet any international situation that might be thrust upon it. It is my belief that the impracticabilities of the ORANGE Plan, in the absence of a better one, have been periodically overlooked in order that the Department might have for budget purposes and presentation to Congress the maximum justification for the necessary enlargement of the Navy. In my opinion, the development of the Naval Establishment has not yet proceeded to the point essential to the successful prosecution of the Plan.

7. In addition to the ORANGE Plan, the Commander-in-Chief has available to him an approved Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. I, and a tentative draft, not as yet approved, of a Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. II. The assumptions of neither of these Plans are applicable to the present situation, nor, to the knowledge of the Commander-in-Chief, is the assistance from allies visualized in the tentative draft of Rainbow No. II a likely possibility.

8. The foregoing considerations are set forth in some length in order to focus attention upon the fact that the Commander-in-Chief finds himself, in what he is led to believe may suddenly become a critical situation, without an applicable directive. He cannot, in the absence of a clear

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CnC File No.
A16/01708

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. & NEW MEXICO, Flagship

20/10

U. S. Navy Yard, Bremerton, Wash.
October 22, 1940

Subject: War Plans - Status and readiness of in view
of the current international situation.

picture of national policy, national commitments and national objectives, formulate his own plans other than for obvious measures of security and defense and for accelerated preparation for further eventualities. He is of the firm belief that successful operations in war can rest only on sound plans, careful specific preparation and vigorous prosecution based upon confidence in the success of the course being pursued.

9. There is no intention or desire on the part of the Commander-in-Chief to evade his legitimate responsibilities nor is it desired that anything in this letter be so construed. It is fully realized that no plan can foresee or provide for every possible situation, and that adjustments and re-estimates must be made to fit the actual situation presented. At the same time, it is most strongly believed that the Commander-in-Chief must be better informed than he is now as to the Department's plans and intentions if he is to perform his full duty.

10. The foregoing is briefly summarized as follows:

- (a) Unsuitability of ORANGE Plan in present situation and present development of Naval Establishment;
- (b) Inapplicability of other Plans available to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet (Rainbow Nos. I and II);
- (c) Vital necessity for (1) new directive (possibly Rainbow No. III) based on present realities, national objectives and commitments as far as these are known or can be predicted at the present time; (2) coordination of plans developed with National Policy and steps to be taken to implement that policy;

CinC File No.

A16/01706

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, FlagshipU. S. Navy Yard, Bremerton, Wash.
October 22, 1940Subject: War Plans - Status and readiness of in view
of the current international situation.

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- (d) In the light of information now available to him, the Commander-in-Chief is of the conviction that the elements of a realistic plan should embody:
- (1) Security and defense measures of the Western Hemisphere;
 - (2) Long-range interdiction of enemy commerce;
 - (3) Threats and raids against the enemy;
 - (4) Extension of operations as the relative strength of the Naval Establishment (may be influenced by allied strength and freedom of action) is built up to support them.
11. Please acknowledge receipt of this letter by despatch.
12. It is hereby certified that the originator considers it to be impracticable to phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a classification other than secret.
13. The exigency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the addressee in time by the next available officer courier. The originator, therefore, authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States.

J. C. RICHMOND

360 322

[1] *Secret*

12 NOVEMBER 1940.

DEAR J. O.: You may think I have been unusually silent for the last couple of weeks,—and so I have. Truth of the matter is that a great part of this time was spent in making up an estimate of the international situation, together with a number of officers in Naval Operations and two from the General Board. As a start on this I sat down one early morning and drew up a twelve page rough estimate, working on up till two o'clock the next morning, this in the effort to clear my own mind, as I sometimes do by drawing up a paper. After I finished the rough notes, I then got together Ingersoll, Turner, Savvy, Charlie Wellborn, Forrest Sherman, Hill, Sexton, Moore and Oscar Badger and we went to it, day and night, Saturdays and Sundays, for about ten consecutive days. The product which no one claims is perfect is now in the hands of the President. I am hoping he will give some definite pronouncement on it in order that I may send you something more authoritative than I otherwise could do.

You know that we have no definite commitments. Perhaps none can be made. The direction which things finally take may be forced upon us.

For example, as you stated in a recent letter:—Upon your first visit here you found us of the opinion that in the event of war, we should not become involved in the Pacific and that any major effort, we might make would be in what we considered the most vital theater, namely, in the Atlantic. I have never changed my viewpoint on that and I may say that so far as I know, neither has the State Department. I believe the Secretary of the Navy also holds this view. But no appeasement.

Nevertheless, we can not afford to neglect the possibility of hostilities in the Pacific and that is why in so many of my letters I always mention keeping a weather eye to the Westward.

I think the study which was made when you were here, has been highly beneficial; studies of this sort always are, whether or not they are implemented.

I had hoped before this to get to you the Navy end of RAINBOW III as a more thoroughly considered directive to meet the possibilities of the present situation in the Pacific. This RAINBOW III plan is nearing completion now and I expect to send it to you in a few days. I trust that you will find the tasks assigned to you are [2] within your power. We will await your comment.

We are pushing District preparation and degaussing work with all the speed we can command and if by any chance I could have until 1 April on this I would give a good deal. One January should see degaussing well along; one April much essential work accomplished in the Districts. Please do not construe that statement to mean that we might get into the war tomorrow, as I have nothing but my own thoughts on this. Nevertheless, you know I have felt right along that it is only a matter of time before we do get in (though I can not say this out loud). The chief question that concerns us is *where* we get in, and *whom* we will fight—and “tomorrow” or perhaps “today” is what I am working towards.

You have received the despatch directing the sending of submarines to Manila. There are no plans at present to send anything more in that direction. But present conditions are far from static, the Japanese appear to be making preparation for a definite move of some kind, and the answer we will give, if any, to the steps they may take in the future can not be predicted at this time.

Your letter regarding the retention of a part of the Fleet on the Coast beyond the date of its intended departure, and also holding another part in Hawaii, arrived at a time when the election prevented my presenting this question promptly to the President. Since the scheduled departure of the units from Hawaii was the day following my receipt of your letter, there was nothing for me to do other than to radio you to carry out the approved schedule. As you know, the matter of withdrawing the Fleet from Hawaii is delicate, and could hardly be accomplished without a certain amount of preparation in Washington. It does not now appear that we can withdraw it without some good pretext.

Regarding this Winter's exercises there is no question as to the desirability of training both the Fleet and the troops in expeditionary operations which will simulate war as closely as possible. Therefore, I believe we should go ahead with the essential features of such a plan. As I understand the plan, you propose to assemble in Pearl Harbor an Expeditionary Force comprising most of the Fleet, plus transports in which are combat-loaded the west contingent of the Fleet Marine Force, plus tankers and supply ships. This expeditionary Force will then set out from Hawaii and will simulate the actual capture of an island, using Christmas Island or some other, perhaps San Clements for example—I have not received a copy of exactly what you plan to do and therefore this conception may be at fault.

We have all been greatly pleased over Churchills statement of recent British action against the Italian Fleet. Also we are more than pleased over the success of the Greeks,—even though it may prove in the end to be temporary. We have nothing more official to date on this than newspaper reports.

[3] Regarding the German claim that they had sunk every ship in the 39-ship convoy in approximately longitude 32, latitude 58: all but 6 of these ships have safely reached port.

Am expecting King to relieve Ellis shortly after the middle of December.

Hope the enclosed to Tommy Hart and Ghormley will be of some interest to you.

Best wishes as always.

Sincerely,

/S/ BETTY.

Admiral J. O. RICHARDSON, *USN*,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS "New Mexico," c/o Postmaster,
Long Beach, California.

[1] *Secret*

12 NOVEMBER 1940.

DEAR TOMMY: We are pushing ahead as rapidly as possible on the preparation of material and personnel for any eventualities. While there is much still to be done (a condition that will continue to exist for years) I can not say that matters are unsatisfactory, so far as concerns things under my control. But we do not yet know the direction which affairs may take.

For the past three weeks I have been spending many hours, together with a group of officers particularly concerned, in developing a broad estimate of the material situation as it affects possible naval war operations. This estimate, or study, is now in the hands of the President. I do not expect any immediate decision, but do hope that it will serve to clarify matters so that, at least, those in authority will be fully aware of the implications of any particular policy that may be adopted with respect to the war.

Ghormley tells me the British expected us to be in the war within a few days after the reelection of the President—which is merely another evidence of their slack ways of thought, and of their non-realistic views of international political conditions, and of our own political system. They have been talking, in a large way, about the defense of the Malay Barrier, with an alliance between themselves, us, and the Dutch, without much thought as to what the effect would be in Europe. But we have no idea as to whether they would at once begin to fight were the Dutch alone, or were we alone, to be attacked by the Japanese. Then again, the copy of the British Far Eastern War Plan which Thomas obtained at Singapore, shows much evidence of their usual wishful thinking. Furthermore, though I believe the Dutch colonial authorities will resist an attempt to capture their islands, I question whether they would fight if only the Philippines, or only Singapore, were attacked.

The Navy can, of course, make no political commitments. Therefore, we can make no specific military plans for an allied war. However, as I told you in my despatch, you can perform a useful service by laying, with the British and possibly the Dutch, a framework for a future plan of cooperation, should we be forced into the war. I rather doubt, however, that the Dutch will talk freely with you. If they do my idea would be that you would explore [2] the fields of:

Command arrangements,

General objectives,

General plan of cooperative action, including the approximate naval and military deployment.

You are, of course, committed to assist the Army in the defense of Luzon. But with allied bases to fall back on, your direct support of the Army might well fall short, in degree, of the support you would afford were we alone to fight Japan.

I do not believe Japan will attack us if she can avoid doing so. In fact, I believe she will go far to avoid hostilities with the United States. It is even doubtful if she wishes, at this time to fight the British or the Dutch. It seems more likely that she would prefer, while maintaining a position in readiness, to consolidate Indo-China with her positions further north, and to begin a more or less gradual economic penetration of the Netherlands East Indies and Siam. Should we refrain from imposing additional economic sanctions, present conditions, including the recent 1,800,000 ton oil contract, might be stabilized over a considerable period of the future. Our State Department, as you may know, had a hand in the execution of that contract.

But we never can tell. Should a war develop between Japan and an alliance of British, Dutch and Americans, I believe that Japan will plan to:

(a) Occupy Guam, and reenforce the Mandates with troops, submarines, and some air;

(b) Establish naval control of Philippine waters by destroying our naval and air forces, basing her main fleet in the Pescadores and a strong, fast detachment in Halmahera;

(c) Capture Luzon with troops now based in Formosa and Hainan;

(d) Capture Borneo, to be followed by a campaign against the Dutch directed from East to West.

I believe that the allied objective should be to reduce Japan's offensive power through economic starvation; the success of the blockade would surely depend upon allied ability to hold the major portion of the Malay Barrier. Your own action would, of course, be based upon your view as to the most effective method of contributing to the attainment of the ultimate objective.

One thing (and this is for your ears alone) you can depend upon is that we would support you, probably by sending a naval reinforcement to you at Soerabaja or Singapore, and by other means. I would be glad to get your views as to the size and composition of such a reinforcement; but in making your recommendation I trust you will keep in mind that our Navy must hold in the Mid-Pacific, that we may also be in the war against the other two Axis Powers, and that the collapse of Britain would force us to a major re-orientation toward the Atlantic.

You may will appreciate that I do not welcome such a war (British Collapse).

The naval part of the War Plan, Rainbow III, for this possible war is about completed, and will be on its way to you within a short time. We are hoping to send naval attache's to Singapore, Batavia, Soerabaja, Balikpapan, and Ceylon; possibly one of these officers may bring this plan to you via air transportation.

We are all delighted to be able to put over the dependent thing for you. The State Department strongly supported us. I can appreciate the coals that must have been heaped upon you when it was learned that, while we were forcing our dependents home, the Army was sending dependents out.

You know how glad I always am for any opportunity to assist any or all of the Little Harts, as well as the Big Hart, in any way in which I can.

Keep cheerful,

Sincerely,

/S/ BETTY.

Admiral T. C. HART, *U. S. Navy,*

Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet.

P. S. Am sixty today. Here's hoping! The first three score are the hardest!

18 NOVEMBER 1940.

ADMIRAL HART:

P. S. Admiral Brownson's name is being submitted to the President on the list going over to him for consideration in connection with the new destroyer. Here's hoping.

[1] Confidential

NOVEMBER 22, 1940.

DEAR JO: While you were here in early October we sent a despatch to Comfourteen to ascertain from Admiral Bloch whether or not the protection being afforded to the vital elements of the Naval Establishment in Hawaii was satisfactory, this in order that, if required, we could make representations to the War Department to direct more thorough protection on the part of its Hawaiian Department.

Admiral Bloch's answers to this despatch and to a second despatch on the same subject were not very definite, and did not provide basis for further action by the Department.

Since the Taranto incident my concern for the safety of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor, already great, has become even greater. This concern has to do both with possible activities on the part of Japanese residents of Hawaii and with the possibilities of attack coming from overseas. By far the most profitable object of sudden attack in Hawaiian waters would be the Fleet units based in that area. Without question the safety of these units is paramount and imposes on the Commander-in-Chief and the forces afloat a responsibility in which he must receive the complete support of Commandant Fourteen, and of the Army. I realize most fully that you are giving this problem comprehensive thought. My

object in writing you is to find out what steps the Navy Department and the War Department should be taking to provide additional equipment and additional protective measures.

For instance, it is desirable to place torpedo nets within the harbor itself? I will appreciate your comments and those of Comfourteen on this question.

Antiaircraft protection can be provided first by units of the Fleet actually in Pearl Harbor with guns ready at all times; by stationing about the Navy Yard of Army A. A. defense measures including mobile batteries; and possibly by utilization of Marine Defense Battalion Antiaircraft Units now available in the Pearl Harbor areas, or that could be made available. Also by keeping carrier fighters squadrons alerted and ready to go.

[2] Another aspect of local security which prompted the Department's original despatch was the security of the oil tanks against attack from the road passing near by.

I would like to have you take up the whole question upon your return to Hawaii with Comfourteen and with the Army, and let me know of any deficiencies which will require remedial action here in Washington.

Much is being done by the Army, and by the Navy in support of the Army, to maintain security of the Panama Canal. Of at least equal importance is the security of our Fleet against sudden destructive attack. And the Fleet is, as usually must be the case, in a more exposed situation.

I have been in somewhat of a quandry whether to write this letter to you or to write one on similar lines to Admiral Bloch to take up with you and Army. It really is immaterial so long as we get the answer—but after all the Fleet—your command—is the subject. I am sending Admiral Bloch a copy.

My best to you both and to "all your works"—

Sincerely,

H. R. S.

Op-12-VED
Serial O50312 (SC)A16/FF1

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, FlagshipLong Beach, California
November 28, 1940

Dear Betty:

Your last two letters, touching on the security of the Fleet while operating in the Hawaiian area and the prospective operations of the Second Brigade of the Fleet Marine Force with the Fleet during the third quarter have been received.

With regard to the first of these matters, I will take this up with Bloch on my arrival back in Hawaii. This feature of the problem does not give me a great deal of concern and, I think, can be easily provided for. I think torpedo nets within the harbor are neither necessary nor practicable. The area is too restricted and ships, at present, are not moored within torpedo range of the entrance.

The security of the units while carrying out routine operations gives me greater concern, because to provide a reasonable degree of security calls for employment of a great number of Fleet units for security alone, which will consume both time and effort that could, otherwise, be well directed toward training and indoctrination. I feel that the Fleet must operate on either of two assumptions, i.e., (a) that we are at peace and no security measures are required; or (b) that war time measures of security must be carried out. Heretofore, we have carried out limited security measures largely as a basis for training and on the assumption that no foreign power would choose to bring on a war by an attack on the Fleet, but that some misdirected or fanatical nationals might undertake individual and irresponsible attack on Fleet units. Now, however, in the light of your concern over these matters and in view of your better information and position to evaluate the possibilities, I have come to the conclusion that I must operate on the basis of (b) above. I enclose a tentative draft of a directive which I plan to issue upon arrival at Pearl Harbor. It is bound to result in the curtailment of badly needed basic training of new personnel, particularly in destroyers and planes, and some degree of extra discomfort, but under the assumption, this will have to be accepted.

37c

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

In regard to the operations with the Second Brigade, Fleet Marine Force, we had originally planned on a tentative date of January 20. This was based on the readiness of the transports by January 1 and the Department's desire, as I understood it (See Cooke's memorandum to you of October 10) to fit these exercises into the international and diplomatic picture. I do not, of course, know to what extent the picture has been altered or how these exercises now fit in. As you will see later, this makes a great difference in their conception.

According to our information, the last of the "CITY" transports will not be completed, at the yard, until January 23, with a fitting-out period of seven days at a navy yard on top of that. This, with the other four "CITY" class and the EXOCHORDA, will give us six transports by February 1, if the dates now set are met. Allowing for an indoctrination and shakedown period, it does not appear possible to embark the Marines prior to about March 1, with the exercise actually starting in the Hawaiian area around March 10. By that time, the Marines inform me, they will have about 12,000 men, which would, if we took the whole Force, require at least six more transports. This brings up the question of the objectives of the exercise. As I originally understood them, they were to be a full dress rehearsal of an island attack, with the possibility that they might turn into the "real thing." Under this conception, we would, of course, want to carry the entire Force and all their equipment, including organic transportation and ground unit support for their aircraft.

If, however, they are to be largely training exercises, with definitely limited objectives, we can accomplish much needed training for marines, transports and supporting forces by limiting the numbers of men and the quantity of equipment to the facilities provided by the six transports, organizing the units into more or less complete combat teams -- one on each transport. We could, under this assumption, start the exercises much earlier (that is, earlier than waiting for six more transports) and perhaps follow the first ones with a second series applying the lessons learned the first time but utilizing the remaining troops.

Until a decision is reached on the foregoing, I can do little except study the problem and general planning.

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

Preliminary discussion along this line brings out the following:

- (a) The Marines will have only two squadrons of planes. These can be embarked on carriers, but, depending on the scope of the operations, a separate ship or ships (probably a cargo vessel) may be needed to accommodate the ground troops and equipment. *check*
- (b) If the scope of the exercises includes readiness for further eventualities, at least one and probably two, extra cargo ships will be required to carry organic transportation, 90 days' ammunition, and supplies.
- (c) In any concept, something will have to be done about landing boats. I assume that all transports will carry the boats listed in your conversion letter. These will provide, roughly, about 500 boat spaces per ship, whereas 1100 are required per combat team. The remaining 600 boat spaces per transport must either be provided from the supporting ships (manifestly undesirable) or be carried into the transport area by special cargo vessels or boat carriers. I believe we should convert a special boat carrier for this purpose, similar to ones used at Shanghai by the Japanese. *John*
- (d) Transport crews should be ample to provide boat crews for boats carried, boat officers, and organized beach parties. A boat carrier, if provided, should carry the necessary boat crews as part of its complement.
- (e) Transport equipment should include either special tanks for fresh water capable of being carried ashore in boats or sufficient drums to carry water for troops transported.
- (f) If further eventualities are to be provided for, I would want the AMERICAN SEAMAN (Maritime Commission training ship) especially equipped as distilling ship taken over and made available.

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

- (g) The Marines' ammunition situation is critical. I feel sure this is known at Marine Corps headquarters, but it cannot be over-emphasized. They also need pack howitzers, to replace their present heavy and unwieldy guns. *Handwritten: 10/11/41*
- (h) An able, energetic Transport Group Commander must be assigned as soon as possible. This is a man-sized job, requiring ability to work with the Marines. There are many details which can be worked out only by close cooperation. It is my present intention to operate the transports, as soon as each is ready, in the San Diego area, training in loading, embarking, debarking and landing exercises. *Handwritten: 10/11/41*
- (i) To be ready for real service we will have to have bombardment ammunition, preferably at Oahu, where it can be interchanged with service ammunition if found necessary. The only such ammunition now on the West Coast, to my knowledge, is 14"/50, 6"/53 and 5"/51, which would limit the gunfire support to BB's and CL's (7500), whereas CA's, CL's (10,000) and DD's are indicated for this type work. *Handwritten: 10/11/41*

I have told the Marines, as a basis for their present planning, that we will take only so much of the Brigade as can be combat loaded on the six transports, and that these should go prepared with what can be carried, ready for any operations that might be possible East of the 160° East Longitude. *Handwritten: 10/11/41*

We have no reply, as yet, to our letter of October 31, relative to diplomatic arrangements for reconnaissance of CHRISTMAS and MAKIN Islands. Of course, decision as to the suitability of CHRISTMAS must await reconnaissance, and special diplomatic arrangements will have to be made if the landing is to be held there. General Upshur rather favors an exercise on Oahu or similar large island, where opportunity will be afforded for maneuvers after landing. This question, however, cannot be settled now. *Handwritten: 10/11/41*

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship


As I see it, the possibilities as to locale include:

Christmas Island -- if found suitable
Palmyra Island -- probably will limit force
that can be employed to
less than that available
in six transports.

One of Hawaiian
Islands

7. ✓ Please let me know as soon as possible your decision as to the concept and scope of the exercises. I would also appreciate being informed as to the progress made in the conversion of the transports, the provision of landing boats, boat carriers, etc.

With best regards,


Sincerely,

Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. Navy
The Chief of Naval Operations
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

41

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, Dec. 17, 1940.

Secret

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.

Subject: War Plans—Status and Readiness of in View of Current International Situation.

Reference: (a) Cinc's Secret Letter A16/01705 of October 22, 1940.

1. In reply to your recommendation in the above letter that a new war plan be issued, you are informed that Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 3 (W. P. L. 44) has recently been completed. Four advance copies have been forwarded to you by officer messenger. The finished copies of this plan, plus such revisions of WPL-42, Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 1, as have been found desirable for making parts of that plan usable with Rainbow No. 3, will be distributed as soon as practicable through the Registered Publication Section.

2. War Plan Rainbow No. 3 is designed to provide against the most imminent and difficult war situation which may confront the United States in the near future. It is, therefore requested that the Commander in Chief prepare as soon as practicable the operating plans for a war envisaged by Rainbow No. 3.

3. The Chief of Naval Operations has, in the past, kept the Commander in Chief advised as to all matters within his own knowledge which related to current national policy and pending national decisions. This past practice will be continued in the future. However, the Commander in Chief is doubtless aware that the changing world military situation will continue to affect policy, and thus will influence plans for the war operation of the naval forces. It is, of course, impracticable to draw up and to issue new Navy Basic War Plans when merely minor changes in policy occur. The Chief of Naval Operations considers that Rainbow No. 3 is, in its major aspects, suitable for all probable situations which may arise in the near future where the principal portion of the national effort is directed westward. Under study now by the naval and army officials are plans based on assumptions requiring the exertion of the principal portion of the national effort to the eastward (Rainbow No. 5), and also a plan, somewhat similar to Rainbow No. 1, involving the defense of the entire Western Hemisphere against attack from both the east and the west (Rainbow No. 4). So far as now can be foreseen, these three basic plans should be adequate to guide mobilization, initial deployment, and initial operations under all contingencies which are foreseeable at present.

4. In view of the above, it is believed unnecessary to comment on the present applicability of the Orange War Plan, as that Plan was drawn up to guide the prosecution of a war under circumstances which do not now exist.

5. The urgency of this document is such that it will not reach the addressees in time by the next available officer courier. The originator therefore authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States.

/s/ H. R. STARK.

[1] Op-12A-fhg

Secret

23 DECEMBER 1940.

DEAR JO: Your personal letter of November 28th, headed Long Beach, California, arrived here on the 14th of December. While Murphy was here he spoke of this letter as having been prepared before his visit to Washington, but we were unable to locate it. Apparently it was not actually mailed until after the arrival of the NEW MEXICO in Honolulu.

In the meantime undoubtedly Murphy has given you oral answers to some of the questions brought up. However, I have had prepared a memo covering some of the points set forth in your letter, from which I will quote later on.

First, in regard to security, I endeavored to outline to Murphy my idea as to the extent security measures should be prosecuted, namely, that while the extent of security measures required is increasing, it has not yet reached the demands of full war time security. As I discussed with Murphy, there will be an advantage in making occasional sweeps by aircraft and surface craft but it is not yet necessary to make these continuous. I agree with you that the wear and tear on equipment, and the detrimental effects on training, of full security measures should be given due weight.

In regard to the objective of the training exercises, the picture, of course, may change at any time. At present the main objective is the purely training aspect. I feel that it is desirable to conduct the exercises in an area sufficiently distant

from bases, such that the difficulties of the problem are concretely and unavoidably present. It is also desirable that the exercises be conducted on beaches where our probable problems are most closely paralleled. In addition, the islands utilized should provide sufficient area for the maneuvering of the land forces involved.

We desire, of course, to avoid conducting maneuvers which would appear unduly provocative to our friends across the way. On the other hand we also wish to avoid any change in our dispositions which would indicate a walking back of our position in the Pacific. Taking these various factors in mind, I think the use of San Clemente for the final full scale exercises would not be so desirable. One solution that suggests itself is conducting some of the exercises on the island of Lanai, and other part on Christmas or Palmyra, depending upon the results of your reconnaissance of Christmas.

Due to the delays in the transport program it appears necessary to carry out these exercises during the fourth quarter. We have encountered much difficulty in getting transports. The only ships that we have been able to acquire are very old ships—ships with machinery not in the best [2] condition, and in which conversions bring to light structural corrosion and defects which necessitate additional work in effecting satisfactory conversion. Consequently, completions in all cases have been delayed except in the case of the EXOCHORDA, the present HARRY LEE, which was the only fairly new ship. The following table shows the estimated readiness-for-sea dates of the transports now under conversion. (This includes a two-week period for fitting out after the completion of overhaul) :

| Name | Readiness for sea | at Navy Yard |
|------------------------|-------------------|--------------|
| GEORGE F. ELLIOT..... | 24 January..... | Norfolk. |
| HARRY LEE..... | 3 January..... | New York. |
| HEYWOOD..... | 15 February..... | Puget Sound. |
| ANTHONY P. BIDDLE..... | 15 February..... | Mare Island. |
| FULLER..... | 1 March..... | Puget Sound. |
| NEVILLE..... | 28 February..... | Puget Sound. |
| HARRIS..... | 31 May..... | Puget Sound. |
| ZEILIN..... | 31 May..... | Puget Sound. |

Six APD's will be ready for sea on 3 January. The MANLEY, McKEE and STRINGHAM are scheduled to depart Norfolk, on January 6, and the Canal Zone on January 15, and will then report to Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, for duty in the Base Force.

It appears that the HARRIS and ZEILIN will not be ready, even for exercises in the fourth quarter.

Referring to the various points in your letter designated by letters, the situation is about as follows: (I quote from memorandum giving me data in some instances) :

(a) Problems involved in having the Second Marine Aircraft Group participate have undergone some change in view of the pending transfer of the group from San Diego to Pearl Harbor. By the end of the third quarter all three combatant squadrons of Group 2 should be available at Pearl Harbor with effective types of aircraft. It seems practicable to distribute their combatant aircraft among the carriers that will be available. VMJ-2 will also be in Hawaii.

The memorandum submitted on this question states "It is estimated that if planes are carried on CV's there will be 61 officers and 180 enlisted men on board the latter, and that there will be 9 commissioned, 6 warrant officers and 456 enlisted men to be transported by other means. The material required, exclusive of aviation gasoline and oil, will be 460 tons (22,925 cubic feet) of general cargo, and 268 tons (7,320 cubic feet) of high explosives."

[3] In regard to additional ships to carry ground crews and equipment, and to meet the requirements set forth in your paragraph (b), we may have a few cargo ships available for employment during the latter part of March, which may fit in for use in these exercises. It seems, at present, that the ammunition ship recently taken over will not be available before June, because it will be hauling ammunition from the East Coast to the West Coast.

(c) *Availability of boats.*—It now appears probable that all transports will be equipped with landing boats at the time the ships are ready for sea, although it may be necessary initially to substitute 30' boats for 36' boats. In any event, it is anticipated that the boats will be delivered by 1 March. Tank lighters, however, will probably not be delivered before the middle of March. It is expected, however, that Artillery lighters (non-self-propelled) will be completed at Puget

Sound Navy Yard in January, and that these can be substituted for tank lighters until the latter are delivered.

(d) *Ships to act as boat carriers.*—There are no ships at present available to carry excess landing boats.

The question of a special boat carrier was discussed with Murphy during his last visit. Such a vessel, or such vessels, would be useful. However, we continue to encounter the usual difficulty of obtaining funds for the acquisition of auxiliaries of any kind.

(e) Quoting from memorandum: "*Fresh Water Facilities for Marines.* The Second Marine Brigade has adequate facilities for getting water from ship to shore storing and distributing to troops.

This includes:

For movement ship to shore: Tank and artillery lighters, double bottoms
5 gal. water cans.

For storage ashore: 14 canvas tanks—3000 gal. capacity.

For distribution to troops: 10 water carts, 5 gal. water cans.

The Brigade also has the necessary pumps, hose fittings, etc., for handling this water.

Also—they have one water purification unit for purifying water found ashore, if any.

[4] In addition, the Marine Corps has on order, four evaporating sets for experimental use—with the capacities as follows:

1—5000 gal. per day.

1—1000 gal. per day.

2—smaller, exact capacity not yet determined.

If satisfactory this equipment will be made standard and provided to Marine Brigades."

In addition to the above there are being procured and placed in storage, with other advanced base equipment, well-digging equipment and 13 sets of evaporator and water purifying apparatuses distributed as follows:

5 at San Francisco.

4 at Charleston.

4 at Panama.

This information can undoubtedly be obtained in the detail desired from the Fleet Marine Force at San Diego, California.

(f) *Use of the "American Seaman" as a distilling ship.*—The ship is at present at St. Petersburg, Florida, and is currently engaged in training personnel for the Maritime Commission. A sister ship, the AMERICAN SAILOR, will be completed about the middle of February 1941. Although these ships are suitable as distilling ships it is not desired to divert them from their present use in training merchantseamen unless a major emergency develops.

(g) Your statements about the Marine ammunition situation are well founded. We have been making strenuous efforts to remedy the Small Arms Ammunition situation, not only for the Marines but also for other Naval Small Arms, aircraft and ship, for many months. The situation has been brought to the attention of the Secretary many times. No satisfactory remedial action in the near future appears possible, but we will pry out of the Army all we can.

It is estimated that there are now between 5 and 10 units of fire of various callbers available on the West Coast.

The organization of the Second Marine Brigade calls for 12—Pack Howitzers or (75 m/m guns) for each of the two battalions. They have

12—Pack Howitzers.

12—3" (75 m/m) guns.

There is some shortage of fire control equipment, but the units can operate without it.

[5] (h) Captain Braisted has been designated by the Bureau of Navigation for duty in command of the Transports in the Pacific. He is due to report about January 3.

(i) The Bureau of Ordnance has been requested to provide in OAHU at the earliest date practicable, the following bombardment ammunition:

14"—500 rounds, loaded and fused.

8"—All available rounds of the 1000 now on order.

6"—1000 rounds, loaded and fused.

5"—5000 rounds, loaded and fused.

4"—5000 rounds, loaded, fused, and assembled.

The 14" ammunition is now on order and it is expected to be available about May or June.

The 8" ammunition is also on order, but delivery is not expected before the latter part of calendar year 1941.—In connection with bombardment however, you have available quite a bit of 8" ammunition still fitted with instantaneous fuses. The situation in this respect is as follows:

| Ship or station: | No. of 8" projectiles fitted with instantaneous fuses |
|--|--|
| ASTORIA----- | 110 |
| INDIANAPOLIS----- | 66 |
| NEW ORLEANS----- | 110 |
| NORTH HAMPTON----- | 126 |
| PENSACOLA----- | 105 |
| MARE ISLAND (Note: Some fuses may have been changed)----- | 324 |
| OAHU----- | 999 |
| HINGHAM----- | 1,000 |

NOTE.—These projectiles can be used in either the long chamber or short chamber.

The 6", 5", and 4" ammunition will be shipped to OAHU by the NITRO or the LASSEN in February or March.

The present estimated availability of bombardment ammunition is as follows:

14"—307 East Coast; 151 Mare Island.

8"—1000 rounds on order—Delivery from 6 to 10 mos.

6"/53—2657 East Coast; 300 Mare Island; 379 Puget Sound; 1989 Cavite.

5"/51—36,000 East Coast; 2000 Mare Island; 1300 Puget Sound; 167 Pearl Harbor; 777 Cavite.

It should be noted that the 5"/25 and 38 caliber service ammunition is considered to be suitable for use as bombardment ammunition.

[6] In regard to CHRISTMAS or MAKIN Islands—The State Department did not wish to ask permission to visit Christmas Island for fear of jeopardizing our claim but suggested that we proceed with the visit without permission and they would bear the brunt of any repercussions. However, we decided as a matter of courtesy to inform the British Naval Attache. The British Government replied by note to State saying the visit was agreeable but that it would in no way reflect on their claim which was unassailable. You therefore have permission to make a reconnaissance of Christmas Island. In the event that your reconnaissance indicated the suitability of Christmas Island for landing exercises, decision can be made later as to whether it is advisable to use Christmas Island and as to just what steps should be taken in advising with the British authorities.

Permission was obtained for reconnaissance flight over Makin on about November 15. However, we questioned the advisability of taking such an open step—a step that might indicate our future intentions. Therefore we did not communicate this permission to you. We postponed answering the letter because of the protracted correspondence regarding Christmas. There is, of course, a certain amount of information available in the Naval Air Pilot, H. O. No. 184, and in charts 2179 (consecutive 1632), and No. 121 (1631) which have been furnished you.

Murphy's visit was extremely profitable to all hands. I trust that on his return he was able to give answer to many of the questions that have arisen in your mind.

If there is anything which you have asked for and which is not included in this letter or supplied by Murphy—other than the answer to the Pye memorandum concerning which you will receive an answer in the near future—please let me know, and I will supply the answer if I can. We are continuing daily bulletins to you and have received the first semimonthly summary.

There is little that I can add which is not repetition, but I shall repeat just the same that every 24 hours past is just one day nearer to actual hostilities and that your flag officers and captains should be completely in the frame of mind that we will be in the fighting business most any time, and purely as a guess on my own part, I would say at any time after the next 90 days. Our heads and our hearts and every ounce of energy that we have should be devoted exclusively to the business of war and keeping fit—and I don't mean maybe.

It may come anytime. All good wishes.

/s/ BETTY.

P. S. Referring to your recent dispatch on the subject, it does not appear on its face that the Captain of the destroyer concerned followed up his contact to the nth degree or even asked for additional help to locate. However, we will reserve all judgment on this episode until we hear further from you.

[1] Op-12A-drc

Secret

23 DECEMBER 1940.

Admiral THOMAS C. HART,

Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet,
U. S. S. "Houston," Flagship, Manila, P. I.

DEAR TOMMY: Your letter of December 4 containing Purnell's report of his conference with the British arrived a day or two after McCrea's departure, en route for Honolulu and Manila. McCrea will be able to give you the answers to some of the questions raised in your letter. However, I will refer to them herein even though I may be duplicating.

I agree with the two big points in the situation that you outline. The location of the "command post" would, however, depend, in my opinion, very much on the conditions obtaining.

Purnell's report gives me an interesting and valuable atmospheric background for the consideration of the situation in that area.

To follow your letter on down, the Department realizes very acutely the limited capacity of the obsolete equipment at Cavite. Measures are under way to improve the situation by giving you better equipment, and perhaps more equipment.

The planners in the War Plans Division, and in the Districts Division are giving very close scrutiny to the problem of laying an anti-motor boat boom in 25 fathoms of rough water, and are looking into the question of supplying the large amount of material that will be required for nets, etc. [2] It is apparent that not only will it be a job to get the material to you, but also you will be confronted with a job of getting it put together and laid down.

The mine plan from Manila Bay has been recently received here and in the War Department, and is under study. In reaching an answer the planners will undoubtedly be guided by your requirements for ingress and egress of ships through the entrance.

In regard to your next paragraph, I am completely with you and have sought at every turn to improve the security of Manila Bay and the Philippines. I might say in this connection that opinion in general, in regard to how far we should go in maintaining our position in the Philippines seems to be changing upward. While such a change is going on, it is not always practicable to be definitely final on questions that arise. In the mean time we will send you all of the material you ask for to the extent it can be made available and can be shipped.—Incidentally, send me a sample of your "bitches". I'll send you a bale of cloth for their enlargement. More power to you!

We have already requested your advice as to sending out division of birdboat mine sweepers. The division will be fitted out for magnetic mine sweeping in late January or perhaps in February.

In regard to your various recommendations on air matters, I will say that I perhaps in at least some of the instances would have made recommendations similar to yours had I been in your place, with the knowledge then available to you and your staff. However, the recommendations from the ASIATIC must be considered in the light of our expanding aviation program as well as that of foreign countries, and in the light of our plans not only for Manila and the Philippines, but also for the rest of the naval establishment. For some time we had had it in our minds to increase the submarine force in the ASIATIC and to make this force more effective by adding to the patrol plane strength. An additional requisite, of course, has been an increase in the fighter strength of the Army. Only recently has the Army gone along with us on this [3] point. I might add, parenthetically, that as we have increased the patrol plane strength, we have decreased the amount of overhead per plane. Altogether, I hope that we have made available to you a substantial increase in your power to carry out possible war tasks.

I can thoroughly appreciate your difficulties in regard to the movement of dependents; and if the pressure on you gets too heavy just pass the responsibility for it on my shoulders. I could even with the babes yet unborn were on their way home.

I presume this letter will reach you before McCrea's departure. His orders indicate his remaining with you for nine days. However, you and he may find it desirable for him to remain sometimes longer, in which case I will of course be glad to have him extend his visit.

/s/ BETTY.

C-416-3/A7-2/MD14
(629)OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
AND
NAVY YARD, PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII, U. S. A.

30 DEC 1940

CONFIDENTIAL~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

From: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
To : The Chief of Naval Operations.
Via : Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Subject: Situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet and the Present Ability of the Local Defense Forces to Meet Surprise Attacks.

References: (a) Oynav dispatch 092135 of October 1940.
 (b) Oynav dispatch 168188 of October 1940.
 (c) Chief of Naval Operations' personal letter addressed to CINCUS dated 22 November 1940 (copy sent to Com 14).
 (d) Com 14 dispatch 150055 of October 1940.
 (e) Com 14 dispatch 230230 of October 1940.

1. In view of the inquiries contained in references (a), (b) and (e), I consider it desirable to write this letter to set forth the present ability of the Fourteenth Naval District to meet surprise hostile attacks of an enemy with the equipment and forces at hand.

2. AIRCRAFT RAIDS.

Aircraft attacking the base at Pearl Harbor will undoubtedly be brought by carriers. Therefore, there are two ways of repelling attack. First, by locating and destroying the carrier prior to launching planes. Second, by driving off attacking bombers with anti-aircraft guns and fighters. The Navy component of the local defense forces has no planes for distant reconnaissance with which to locate enemy carriers and the only planes belonging to the local defense forces to attack carriers when located would be the Army bombers. The Army has in the Hawaiian area fifty-nine B-18 bombers. All of these are classified as being obsolete. The model is six years old and the planes themselves are five years old. Therefore, it is my opinion that neither numbers nor types are satisfactory for the purposes intended. New combat planes are expected sometime in the future. However, not before July 1941. For distant reconnaissance, requisition would have to be made on the forces afloat for such as could be spared by the Fleet.

To drive off bombing planes after they have been launched will require both fighting planes and anti-aircraft guns. The Army has in the Hawaiian area thirty-six pursuit planes, all of which are classified as obsolete. Some of them are six years old and some of them are four years old. In numbers and models, there is a serious deficiency existing. New fighters are expected when the P-40 is in production to

C-116-1/A7-2/MD14

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
AND
NAVY YARD, PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII, U. S. A.~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

30 DEC 1940

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Subject: Situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet and the Present Ability of the Local Defense Forces to Meet Surprise Attacks.

the extent that the 180 projected for Hawaii can be delivered. This does not appear to be probable before the end of 1941; this number does not appear adequate.

The Army is charged with the protection of the Pearl Harbor base by anti-aircraft guns. There are in Hawaii twenty-six fixed 3-inch guns and forty-four mobile 3-inch guns. There are projected twenty-four more, to be delivered in 1941. There are no 37-millimeter and only 109 .50 caliber out of the projected 180 37-millimeter and 308 .50 caliber machine guns. The Army plans to place the greater part of the 3-inch guns around Pearl Harbor and only a few near other military objectives. In my opinion, it will be necessary to increase the numbers of guns around Pearl Harbor greatly to have any semblance of anti-aircraft defense. Furthermore, I express my doubt as to the efficiency of a 3-inch gun with a 21-second fuse for driving off high altitude bombers. The Army has made no plans for the anti-aircraft defense of Lualualei or Kaneohe; furthermore, it will be necessary to have a considerable concentration of anti-aircraft guns to defend the shipping terminals and harbor of Honolulu in order that lines of communication may be kept open. With a limited knowledge of the density of anti-aircraft barrages abroad, I am of the opinion that at least 500 guns of adequate size and range will be required for the efficient defense of the Hawaiian area. This number is in addition to 37-millimeter and .50 caliber machine guns.

In addition to the above, the Army has planned an aircraft warning service which will consist of eight Radar stations. Three of these stations are fixed and five are mobile. When completed at an indefinite time in the future, this warning net should be adequate.

3. DEFENSE AGAINST SUBMARINES.

The ideal defense against submarines would be conducted by patrol vessels and aircraft working in conjunction. The district has no aircraft for this purpose. Recently, there have arrived here three vessels of Destroyer Division EIGHTY which is assigned to the local defense forces. These vessels have listening gear and, when repaired and ready for service, will be a valuable contribution for anti-submarine and escort work. A large number of patrol vessels will be required for anti-submarine work in the vicinity of Oahu and the other

C-116-1/A7-2/MD14
(629)OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
AND

PEARL HARBOR NAVAL YARD, PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII, U. S. A.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONFIDENTIAL

306-0-1000

Subject: Situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet and the Present Ability of the Local Defense Forces to Meet Surprise Attacks.

islands. At present, the district has none and request would have to be made on the Fleet for such vessels and planes as could be spared for this most important work. No anti-submarine nets are planned, nor are any considered desirable. Anti-torpedo nets are projected for the entrances of Honolulu and Pearl Harbor. They will probably be delivered about 1 March 1941. The net depot will be completed somewhat later. *a*

4. DEFENSE AGAINST MINES.

The district has recently built and equipped one sweep barge and three tugs are being equipped for towing and energizing the coil. This barge can probably look out for Honolulu and Pearl Harbor until such time as it is seriously injured. The district has no vessels available for use as sweeps for anchored mines. A number of mine sweepers are being built or purchased, but their delivery dates here are uncertain. A large number of sweepers will be required in order to keep the harbors of Pearl Harbor, Honolulu and Kaneohe clear and, in addition, Hilo on Hawaii, Kahului and Lahaina on Maui, and Port Allen and Nawiliwili on Kauai. With the delivery of sweepers now being built or purchased, the general situation will be improved immeasurably.

5. DEFENSE AGAINST BOMBARDMENT.

The coast defenses of the Army are considered adequate except that Kaneohe receives very little protection from the batteries.

6. SUBOTANKS.

There are two tank farms, the upper and the lower. The lower is entirely contained in the government reservation and, by the use of roving patrols, is considered reasonably secure. The upper farm is adjacent to a public highway. The farm is surrounded by an unrelaxable fence and each tank with an earth berm. Its chief exposure is along the highway. To counteract this, three elevated sentry stations have been erected, each equipped with searchlights. This enables sentries to keep a continuous lookout over the entire fence line day and night; the upper farm is considered fairly secure.

7. WATER AND ELECTRIC SUPPLY.

Recently, a guard house has been erected and an outplacement

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C-116-1/A7-2/MB14
(629)OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
AND
1007 YARD, PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII, U. S. A.**CONFIDENTIAL**

30 DEC 1940

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet and the Present Ability of the Local Defense Forces to Meet Surprise Attacks.

has been made, the Marines alternating with the Army, for constant guard on the water supply.

A constant guard is kept on the electric supply lines through which outside power is received.

8. An elaborate system of photographic passes, search and examination is in effect. There are over 5,000 Civil Service employees who come into the yard each day. In addition, there are about 5,000 employees of civilian contractors and several thousand enlisted men. In addition to the above, there is a constant stream of trucks and vehicles of all descriptions carrying supplies, stores, et cetera. It is impossible to maintain absolute security without disruption of the work of the yard. However, surprise searches and periodic stops, et cetera, are in effect in order that the alert may be emphasized. The main gate has been strengthened to prevent rushing; there have been two drills for the purpose of giving surprise training to the yard garrison in the event of a surprise riot in the yard. In addition to the above, a survey has been made not only of the yard but of all of the outlying stations, and every effort is being made to close holes and stop gaps. While the Commandant is not satisfied, he feels that the precautions taken are reasonably effective but that they are susceptible to improvement, which will be made as occasion warrants.

9. It should be borne in mind that until comparatively recently none of us in this country had very much conception of what measures were necessary and what provisions were desirable in order to effect any measure of protection against aircraft, against submarines, against mines and against subversive elements. The officers and men of this command have been alert, zealous and vigilant in executing all measures under their control in order to properly prepare the district for any exigencies.

10. It should be assumed that the War Department is fully aware of the situation here and that they are proceeding vigorously with a view to overcoming deficiencies. It may be that they have failed to recognize the necessity for large numbers of anti-aircraft guns and pursuit planes. I suggest that the Chief of Naval Operations make inquiry from the War Department as to what their plans are and on what dates they predict that they will be accomplished and then, if the

(1)

C-116-1/A7-2/MD14
(629)

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
AND
NAVY YARD, PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII, U. S. A.

CONFIDENTIAL

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Subject: Situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet and the Present Ability of the Local Defense Forces to Meet Surprise Attacks.

numbers and dates are not satisfactory, these features may be discussed at length.

11. It is considered highly undesirable from my point of view that the War Department should in any way come to believe that there is lack of agreement between the Army authorities and Navy authorities here, or that the officials of the Fourteenth Naval District are pressing the Navy Department to do something in regard to Army matters.

C. C. BLOCH

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4728-1/ES

UNITED STATES FLEET
U.S.S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

A16/

Serial 022.

Pearl Harbor, T.H.,
January 8, 1942.

CONFIDENTIAL

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
Com 14 Conf. Ltr.
C-A16-1/A7-2/ND14
(629) of 30 Dec. 1940.

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
To : The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet
and the Present Ability of the Local Defense
Forces to Meet Surprise Attacks.

1. Forwarded. The Commander-in-Chief has conferred with the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. As a result of the conference with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and an inspection in company with him, information was furnished the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District who prepared the basic letter. The Commander-in-Chief concurs with the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District in the opinion that the present Army Pursuit Squadrons and anti-aircraft batteries are inadequate to protect the Fleet and Pearl Harbor against air attack. When established the proposed pursuit strength will be adequate. The proposed total of 68 mobile three-inch guns for this area is not considered adequate. With the almost continuous high ceiling prevailing in this area a materially greater number of larger and longer range anti-aircraft guns are necessary to counter high altitude bombing attacks on Pearl Harbor.

2. As neither the increased anti-aircraft batteries nor the augmented pursuit squadrons will be available for an extended period the defense of Fleet units within Pearl Harbor will have to be augmented by that portion of the Fleet which may be in Pearl Harbor in event of attack by hostile aircraft. Plans for co-operation with the local defense forces are being made. At present the continuous readiness of carrier fighter squadrons or anti-aircraft batteries is not contemplated. The improbability of such an attack under present conditions does not, in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, warrant interrupting entirely the training required by Fleet Air Units which would have to be largely curtailed if constant readiness of a fighter squadron were required.

*Copies introduced
- 1/8/42
Captains etc
Judge Advocate*

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ENSEMBLE
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, U.S.N.

EX 28 420

UNITED STATES FLEET
U.S.S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

Al6/

Serial 022.

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet
 and the Present Ability of the Local Defense
 Forces to Meet Surprise Attacks.

3. There does not appear to be any practicable way of placing torpedo baffles or nets within the harbor to protect the ships moored therein against torpedo plane attack without greatly limiting the activities within the harbor, particularly the movements of large ships and the landing and take-off of patrol squadrons. Inasmuch as Pearl Harbor is the only operating base available to the Fleet in this area any passive defense measures that will further restrict the use of the base as such should be avoided. Considering this and the improbability of such an attack under present conditions and the unlikelihood of an enemy being able to advance carriers sufficiently near in wartime in the face of active Fleet operations, it is not considered necessary to lay such nets.

4. The defense against submarines and mines are considered adequate under present peace time conditions, but early installation of underwater sound-submarine detection system should be made. Also the delivery of the required ships to the Fourteenth Naval District Defense Forces should be expedited, particularly ships for sweeping magnetic and anchored mines.

5. In this connection, it is urgently recommended that Local Defense Forces, adequate for the protection of naval installations at Pearl Harbor and the Fleet units based thereon, be provided the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District. In order to provide freedom of action for the United States Fleet, and further, to avoid the necessity for detailing important Fleet units (because no other ships are available) to tasks requiring only part of their full capabilities, it is considered that the forces provided should be sufficient for full protection and should be independent of the presence or absence of ships of the U.S. Fleet. It is further considered that the provision of adequate

- 2 -

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Secret Mail Office

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UNITED STATES FLEET
U.S.S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

Serial 022.

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet
and the Present Ability of the Local Defense
Forces to Meet Surprise Attacks.

Local Defense Forces for the Fourteenth Naval District should
be given higher priority than continental Naval Districts, where
both the possibilities of, and objectives for, attack are much
less. *R*

J. O. RICHARDSON,

Copy to:
Com FOURTEEN

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44C

CinC File No.

A16/0129

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, FlagshipSECRETPearl Harbor, T. H.
January 25, 1941

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Chief of Naval Operations' Plan DOG.

References: (a) Opnav secret despatch 212155 of
January, 1941.
(b) Opnav memorandum for Secnav Op-12-UTB
of November 12, 1940.

1. Reference (a) was received by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, one day prior to the arrival of Commander McCrea at Pearl Harbor en route to the Navy Department. It is considered desirable to take advantage of his return to inform the Chief of Naval Operations of the views of the Commander-in-Chief as to the new situation.

2. In view of reference (a) and some degree of urgency implied therein, it is considered that study of the new situation and the preparation of plans therefor should take priority over the preparation of plans for Rainbow No. 3. Unless advice to the contrary is received, this will be done.

3. The new situation, as visualized by the Commander-in-Chief, alters the assumptions and concepts of Rainbow No. 3, principally in that the major offensive effort of the United States is to be exerted in the Atlantic, rather than in the Pacific, and in that a "waiting attitude" will be taken in the Pacific, pending a determination of Japan's intentions. If Japan enters the war or commits an overt act against United States' interests or territory, our attitude in the Pacific will be primarily defensive, but opportunities will be seized to damage Japan as situations present themselves or can be created.

4. Under the foregoing general conception, it is deemed desirable to outline as briefly as possible, certain tentative assumptions, upon which the actions of the U. S. Fleet in the Pacific will be predicated. These are:

- (a) The United States is at war with Germany and Italy.

(179)

exhibit 70

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EXHIBIT 70

46a

CinC File No.
 A15/0129

UNITED STATES FLEET
 U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

SECRET

Pearl Harbor, T. H.
 January 25, 1941

Subject: Chief of Naval Operations' Plan DOG.

- (4) Protect United States' shipping. This will require the following:
- (a) Provide escort for important ships.
 - (b) Route allied and United States' shipping in the Fleet Control Zone.
 - (c) Base cruisers on Samoa to cover shipping in the South Seas.
 - (d) Despatch the Southeastern Pacific Force.
 - (e) Establish escort and patrol group between Hawaii and the West Coast.
 - (f) Maintain striking group to operate against raiders (search for raiders might afford opportunity to reconnoiter the Marshall Islands without provoking Japan).
- (5) Protection of outlying islands. This will require the following:
- (a) Establish defense battalions at Midway and Samoa and smaller units at Johnston, Wake, Fanning and Canton.
 - (b) Maintain submarine patrols at all the above-mentioned islands, except Samoa.
 - (c) Despatch two submarines, plus the ORTOLAN, for the defense of Unalaska.
- (6) Adjust U. S. Fleet training to war conditions.

CinC File No.
A16/0129

UNITED STATES FLÉET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

SECRET

Pearl Harbor, T. H.
January 25, 1941

Subject: Chief of Naval Operations' Plan DOG.

Additional Measures if Japan enters War

- (7) Make initial sweep for Japanese merchantmen and raiders in the Northern Pacific. *U*
- (8) Establish submarine patrols in the Marshall Islands, withdrawing them from own outlying islands as necessary.
- (9) Make early reconnaissance in force of the Marshall Islands. Thereafter conduct a general surveillance of that area and make raids on forces, material installations, and communications therein.
- (10) Make periodic sweeps toward the Marianas and Bonins.

N
6. It will, of course, be realized that the effectiveness with which the tasks set forth above can be prosecuted is dependent upon the forces available, especially after the withdrawal of the Atlantic reinforcements. If a carrier is to be included in the Atlantic reinforcement, one of the LEXINGTON class should be selected due to difficulties of handling in Pearl Harbor. There is, however, definite need for all four carriers under the tasks assigned this fleet.

7. In connection with the execution of the foregoing tasks, and with particular reference to the early initiation of offensive operations, it must be pointed out that the existing deficiencies in the defenses of Cahu and in the Local Defense forces of the Fourteenth Naval District impose a heavy burden on the fleet for purely defensive purposes. Ideally, a Fleet Base should afford refuge and rest for personnel as well as opportunity for maintenance and upkeep of material installations. When fleet planes, fleet guns and fleet personnel are required to be constantly ready for defense of its own Base, the wear and tear on both men and material can not but result in impaired readiness for active operations at sea. The most outstanding deficiencies affecting this readiness of the fleet are:

CinC File No.
A16/0129

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

SECRET
Pearl Harbor, U. S.
January 25, 1941

Subject: Chief of Naval Operations' Plan 00' .

- (a) The critical inadequacy of A.A. guns available for the defense of Pearl Harbor, necessitating constant manning of ships' A.A. guns while in port.
- (b) The small number and obsolescent condition of land-based aircraft, necessitating constant readiness of striking groups of fleet planes and use of fleet planes for local patrols.
- (c) Lack of suitable local defense vessels for the Fourteenth Naval District, necessitating detail of fleet units to this duty. The detail of fleet units to this duty not only results in loss, to the fleet, of the availability of important vessels, but also results in the forced employment of ships whose more valuable characteristics will be largely wasted due to the nature of their tasks. This is particularly true where destroyers must be diverted to local A/S patrol, off-shore patrol and local escort. These duties could better be performed by submarine chasers, converted gunboats and converted escort vessels.
- (d) Lack of aircraft detection devices ashore.

6. It is considered imperative that immediate measures be undertaken to correct the critical deficiencies enumerated above. It is further believed that these measures should take priority over the needs of continental districts, the training program, and material aid to Great Britain. u

CinC File No.
A16/0129

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

SECRET

Pearl Harbor, T. H.
January 25, 1941

Subject: Chief of Naval Operations' Plan DOG.

9. It is recommended that the Alaskan and Hawaiian reinforcements referred to in paragraph 2103(a)(5) of W.P.L. 44 (advance copy) be despatched as soon as possible in order that necessity for heavy escort may not embarrass the U. S. Pacific Fleet in its later operations.

10. This letter has been prepared in collaboration with the prospective Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. N. It represents his, as well as my own, views.

J. O. RICHARDSON

Copy to: Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel

COPY

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Op-12-CTB(SC)A16(R-3) Serial 014412

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 10 February 1941.*Secret*

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Chief of Naval Operations Plan D.

References: (a) Cinc, U. S. Pacific Fleet, secret ltr. A16/0129 of January 25, 1941.
(b) SecNav secret ltr. to SecWar, Serial 09112 of January 24, 1941.

1. Receipt is acknowledged of reference (a).

2. Since the plans to be prepared under the directives of WPL-44 will be applicable to a large extent to the situation presented by Plan D, the Chief of Naval Operations desires that planning under WPL-44 continue to have the highest priority.

3. The general concept, the assumptions, and the tasks under a Plan D situation, outlined in paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 of reference (a), are in accord with the views of the Chief of Naval Operations.

4. In connection with the initial sweep for Japanese raiders in the Northern Pacific, mentioned in paragraph 5 (7), a suggestion may here be in order. The Chief of Naval Operations believes it possible that Japan for some time maintained a vessel about 500 miles north of Oahu. Indications are that some similar vessel is now stationed about 1,000 miles southwest of Oahu. In connection with reports of unidentified submarines near Oahu, Panama, the Mexican coast, and in the open sea, it may be surmised that the vessel mentioned above is a submarine tender, and that Japan may plan during war to base submarines on tenders in the open sea. It is considered most inadvisable that we indicate too much curiosity in this respect for the time being. It would be well, however, to keep track of such vessels, and to take immediate steps to sink them on the outbreak of war.

5. With reference to paragraph 7 of reference (a), the Chief of Naval Operations is cognizant of the condition of the defenses of Oahu, and, in view of the inadequacy of the Army defenses, the responsibility which must rest upon the fleet for its own protection while in Pearl Harbor. In this connection, your attention is invited to reference (b), a copy of which was furnished to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. The War Department is taking steps to remedy the situation, but the Commander-in-Chief should constantly press the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department to make all the improvements that lie within his own power.

6. It is noted that no provision is made in the Naval local Defense Force plans of the Fourteenth Naval District for the employment of vessels as a part of an aircraft warning net in the waters to the northward and southward of Oahu. It is suggested that in coordinating the plans of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, this matter be given consideration. It is possible the large sampans equipped with radio might prove useful for this purpose during war.

7. The urgency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the addressee in time by the next available officer courier. The originator therefore authorizes the transmission of this document be registered mail.

/s/ H. R. Stark.
H. R. STARK.

EXHIBIT NO. 10

Op-12B-9-McC (SC)A7-2(2)/FF1
Serial 09112*Secret*

JAN. 24, 1941.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The security of the U. S. Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor, and of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base itself, has been under renewed study by the Navy Department and forces afloat for the past several weeks. This reexamination has been, in part, prompted by the increased gravity of the situation with respect to Japan, and by reports from abroad of successful bombing and torpedo plane attacks on ships while in bases. If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be